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The relationship between trade liberalisation and environmental protection has al-
ways been a prominent issue in the World Trade Organization (WTO).
1
  
On the one hand, the WTO aims at eliminating barriers to trade. On the other 
hand, it intends to promote international trade with due regard to protection and 
preservation of the environment. 
The preamble of the Agreement establishing the WTO, the so called Marrakesh 
Agreement,
2
 points out the general significance of environmental protection and sus-
tainable development. The WTO law contains several provisions concerning the en-
vironment.
3
 However, it is not yet finally clarified in how far WTO Members can 
adopt measures to protect the environment where those measures have trade-
restricting effects. 
This question is particularly problematic where a Member implements such a 
measure unilaterally and the measure affects other countries’ policies. The question 
at stake is to what extent Member States can unilaterally adopt measures to protect 
the environment where those measures have extraterritorial effect, i.e. where those 
measures require other states to change their policies in order to gain access to the 
importing country’s market. 
The GATT
4
/WTO adjudicating body had to deal with two disputes addressing 
this issue, namely the Tuna-Dolphin dispute
5
 and the Shrimp-Turtle case.
6
 These two 
disputes are of outstanding importance for the issue of unilateral measures with ex-
traterritorial effect to protect the environment. 
Both disputes dealt with the question whether import embargoes, that were in-
consistent with Article XI of the GATT for they imposed quantitative import re-
strictions, could be justified under Article XX (g) of the GATT as measures to con-
                                                 
1
 Sabrina Shaw, Risa Schwartz ‘Trade and environment in the WTO’ (2002) 36 Journal of World 
Trade 129. 
2
 Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation 1994 (Marrakesh Agreement). 
3
 See II. 3. a). 
4
 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994. 
5
 Panel Report on United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (1991) DS21/R (Tuna-Dolphin I); 
Panel Report on United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (1994) DS29/R (Tuna-Dolphin II). 
6













serve exhaustible natural resources. The two decisions interpreted Article XX of the 
GATT, particularly paragraph g of that provision, differently.  
According to the panel in Tuna-Dolphin, a unilateral measure that forced other 
countries to change their policies within their own jurisdiction and that could only 
become effective if those changes occurred, did not fall under paragraph g of Article 
XX of the GATT.
 7
  
In contrast to that, pursuant to the Appellate Body (AB) in Shrimp-Turtle, a uni-
lateral measure forcing other countries to change their policies was within the terms 
of paragraph g of Article XX of the GATT but could not be justified if its application 
led to an arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination between countries.
8
 According to 
the AB, the country implementing the measure at stake should have entered into ne-
gotiations with all other countries concerned before adopting the measure. 
The decisions have been much discussed and criticised by legal scholars and en-
vironmentalists. Critics were unsatisfied with the weight that had been given to the 
importance of either environmental protection or international cooperation.
9
 
Despite all discussions, the WTO still has not implemented a provision solving 
the particular issue of unilateral measures dealing with extraterritorial environmental 
concerns. In fact, it is highly unlikely that particularly such a provision will be 
adopted, even if the current trade negation round of the WTO leads to new provisions 
dealing with environmental protection.
10
 That shows how controversial this issue is. 
The question whether countries can unilaterally adopt measures to protect the en-
vironment where those measures have extraterritorial effect must be analysed against 
the backdrop of both WTO jurisprudence and general principles of international law. 
Although this paper supports the Shrimp-Turtle AB report in terms of its ap-
proach to balance conflicting values inherent in the trade-environment conflict,
11
 the 
decision needs to be clarified in some points. For example, according to the AB, 
countries could implement an extraterritorial measure where the protected object and 
                                                 
7
Tuna-Dolphin I para. 5.27-5.29, 5.32; Tuna-Dolphin II para. 5.26, 5.38. 
8
 Shrimp-Turtle para. 186. 
9
 See Robert Howse ‘The Turtles Panel, Another Environmental Disaster in Geneva‘ (1998) 32 Jour-
nal of World Trade 73 at 74, calling the Shrimp-Turtle report an environmental disaster and the Tuna-
Dolphin reports ‘perhaps the most widely criticised rulings of any panels in the GATT’s history.’ 
10
 See an example of a possible provision on environmental protection in Steve Charnovitz ‘The 
WTO’s Environmental Progress‘ (2007) 10 Journal of International Economic Law 685 at 692, 693. 
11












the country adopting the measure had a ‘sufficient nexus’.
12
 However, the AB did not 
elaborate on the nature or requirements of the term ‘sufficient nexus’. Moreover, the 
decision left it unclear when a country has ‘seriously attempted’ to achieve consen-
sus with other countries concerned.
13
 Certain standards are necessary to define this 
term. Also, the AB’s use of multilateral agreements other than the GATT to interpret 
Article XX of the GATT is controversial and has to be analysed. 
Apart from that, the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention need to 
be considered when analysing unilateral measures with extraterritorial effect. These 
principles can pose obstacles to extraterritorial measures. For an analysis, it first 
needs to be clarified what the terms ‘unilateral’ and ‘extraterritorial’ mean in the 
trade-environment context. Afterwards, one must examine whether unilateral and 
extraterritorial measures conflict with the principles of state sovereignty and non-
intervention. 
In addition to that, the approach of balancing conflicting interests in connection 
with trade restricting measures to protect the environment has to be discussed. The 
balancing of interests is used so that none of the countries concerned by a measure 
gets deprived of its rights. That means, in terms of the WTO/GATT, Member States 
must generally be able to invoke their rights under the GATT and, at the same time, a 
Member implementing a trade-restricting measure to protect the environment must 
have the opportunity to make use of the exceptions set out in Article XX of the 
GATT. The approach of balancing conflicting interests shows distinct affinities to 
the principle of proportionality. One must determine the notion of proportionality 
first before discussing the impact of this principle on Article XX of the GATT. 
Furthermore, the legality of unilateral measures with extraterritorial effect to pro-
tect the environment must be examined against the backdrop of the principle of in-
ternational cooperation. It needs to be clarified under what circumstances a state can 
unilaterally adopt extraterritorial measures and when it has to enter into negotiations 
with other states first. Two provisions dealing with international cooperation are par-
ticularly relevant in this context, namely, Article 1 of the Charter of the United Na-
tions (UN Charter) laying down a general obligation to cooperate and Principle 12 of 
                                                 
12
 Shrimp-Turtle para. 133. 
13














 addressing international cooperation in terms of environmental 
concerns. 
In conclusion, this paper will show that both WTO jurisprudence and general 
principles of international law allow unilateral measures with extraterritorial effect to 
protect the environment under certain circumstances.  
Although unilateral measures are not the most desirable solution, they constitute 
an effective means to promote environmental protection as long as the WTO cannot 
come to a negotiated compromise in terms of the trade-environment conflict. In this 
situation, the WTO’s adjudicating body plays a central role since it has to examine 
and judge unilateral measures to protect the environment that have trade-restricting 
effects on a case-by-case basis. The WTO adjudicating body can draw on the 
Shrimp-Turtle decision and particularly on the AB’s approach to balance the conflict-
ing rights at issue. However, it needs to clarify some points of uncertainty and set up 
certain guidelines to guarantee a consistent jurisprudence and legal certainty. 
                                                 
14













II. HISTORY OF THE TRADE-ENVIRONMENT RELATIONSHIP UNDER 
THE WTO/GATT 
To begin with, the history of the trade-environment relation needs to be outlined in 
order to explain the on-going tensions within the WTO. 
 
1. THE BEGINNING OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
The relationship between trade liberalisation and environmental protection has been 
an issue ever since the development of modern international environmental law. 
Modern international environmental law started to develop with the United Na-
tions Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972 (Stockholm Con-




The Stockholm Conference drafted the Stockholm Action Plan that contained 
recommendations for international action regarding, inter alia, natural resources 
management and the integration of environment and development.
16
 Thus, interna-
tional cooperation to improve environmental protection has been promoted already 
more than 25 years before the establishment of the WTO. 
In addition to that, the conference led to the Stockholm Declaration.
17
 Princi-
ples 4, 8 and 18 of the Stockholm Declaration deal with balancing the environment 
and economic development. According to Principle 4, nature conservation must be 
taken into account in planning for economic development. Principle 8 says that 
economic development is necessary for the improvement of conditions on earth lead-
ing to a better quality of life. Moreover, economic development must lead to the con-
trol of environmental risks and the solution of environmental problems, pursuant to 
Principle 18. Hence, the idea that economic development and measures to protect the 
environment need to be combined and balanced, has been written down in an interna-
tional declaration prior to the Marrakesh Agreement. 
                                                 
15
 Daniel Bodansky (ed) et al The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (2008) page 
33; David Hunter et. al. International Environmental Law and Policy (2011) page 143. 
16
 David Hunter et. al. (footnote 15) page 143. 
17












Moreover, the Stockholm Conference led to the establishment of the United Na-
tions Environment Programme (UNEP) in the same year. To this day, it is the prima-
ry UN organ being concerned with the environment.
18
 The UNEP promotes interna-
tional cooperation leading to major international environmental treaties.
19
 
In conclusion, the Stockholm Conference encouraged international cooperation to 
promote environmental protection in the course of economic development. 
However, during the preliminary stages of the Stockholm Conference, environ-
mental protection had to face certain obstacles arising out of trade related concerns. 
In preparation of the conference, the Secretariat of the GATT set up a study on 
‘Industrial Pollution Control and International Trade’ that dealt with the effects of 
environmental protection measures on trade. The study expressed concern that envi-
ronmental protection policies could form obstacles to trade and cause ‘green 
protectionism’.
20
 Thus, the interaction between trade and environmental concerns 
had not yet been well developed. 
 
2. DEVELOPMENTS FROM 1971 TO 1994 
Between 1971 and 1994, several international conferences and committees dealt with 
environmental concerns at the trade-environment interface. However, environmental 
protection had not yet become an interest of the international community as im-
portant as economic development. 
 
a) The Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade 
In 1971, the GATT Council of Representatives established the Group on Environ-
mental Measures and International Trade (EMIT).
21
 
The group should, however, only convene if a party to the GATT requested so. A 
request was not made until 1991 when Austria, on behalf of the EFTA countries,
 22
 
proposed the convening of the EMIT group for, according to the proposal, it was 
                                                 
18




 See the historical overview at The World Trade Organisation ‘Environment: History’ available at 
















necessary to examine potential conflicts between the GATT and recent trade related 
international agreements to protect the environment. 
23
 
The fact that the group only convened 20 years after its establishment shows that 
environmental protection still had not been effective but merely a subordinate con-
cern in relation to economic development. 
 
b) The Tokyo Round 
From 1973 to 1979, the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations took place. 
Amongst other things, it worked out the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT). The TBT Agreement was the first agreement within the GATT that 
dealt with technical regulations and standards in the trade-environment context.
 24
 
The agreement includes, inter alia, technical regulations that have trade restrict-
ing effects to protect animal or plant life or health, or the environment.
25
 Moreover, it 




Hence, the TBT Agreement includes both the approach to combine trade promo-
tion and environmental protection polices and the principle to cooperate internation-
ally. 
 
c) The Uruguay Round 
During the Uruguay Round (1986 –1994) that led to the establishment of the WTO, 
the trade-environment relationship became more and more important.  
At the beginning of the round, the environment was not even on the agenda.
27
 In 
1992, the GATT Report on Trade and the Environment stated that trade-restricting 
measures to protect the environment were counterproductive since they affected eco-
                                                 
23
 GATT Council Overview of the Developments in International Trade and the Trading System, 
Annual Report by the Director General (1991) 3 World Trade Materials 5 at 12. 
24
 Christian Tietje ‘Die völkerrechtliche Kooperationspflicht im Spannungsverhältnis Welthan-
del/Umweltschutz und ihre Bedeutung für die europäische Umweltblume‘ (2000) Europarecht 285 at 
286. 
25
 Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement. 
26
 Article 2.4 and 2.6 of the TBT Agreement. 
27
 Kevin C. Kennedy ‘The Illegality of Unilateral Trade Measures to Resolve Trade-Environment 














 However, in the late stages of the round, environmental 
protection was promoted. This change occurred partly because the Rio Conference 
had been prepared and held during that time.
 29
 The conference promoted interna-
tional environmental protection (see below under II. 2. d). Besides that, environmen-
tal protection became an important issue of the Uruguay Round because of the criti-
cism of the Tuna-Dolphin panel reports (see below under II. 2. e).
30
  
In the end, the preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement made environmental pro-
tection and sustainable development a high priority for the WTO and several WTO 




d) The Rio Conference 
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio took place 
in 1992. It addressed environmental issues in the development context.
32
  
The Rio Conference adopted Agenda 21 which, inter alia, states that trade and the 
environment should be made mutually supportive.
33
 Moreover, the preamble of 
Agenda 21 promotes ‘a global partnership for sustainable development’.
34
 
Besides that, the conference led to the Rio Declaration. According to Principle 12 
of the Rio Declaration, states should cooperate to promote economic growth and sus-
tainable development. Further, ‘[t]rade policy measures for environmental purposes 
should not constitute a means of arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination or a dis-
guised restriction on international trade’.
35
 Moreover, importing countries should 
avoid unilateral actions to protect the environment outside of their jurisdiction. Ra-
ther, international environmental concerns should be addressed by internationally 
agreed measures.  
Thus, Agenda 21 and Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration promote international 
cooperation in terms of environmental protection. In addition to that, the wording of 
sentence 2 of Principle 12 corresponds with the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 




 Christian Tietje (footnote 24) at 286. 
30
 Kevin C. Kennedy (footnote 27) at 394. 
31
 See below under II. 3. a). 
32
 David Hunter (footnote 15) page 154 et seq. 
33
 See for example paragraph 2.3 (b) and paragraph 2.9 (d) of Agenda 21. 
34
 See 1.1 of the preamble of Agenda 21. 
35












that provides the basis for the approach to balance conflicting rights of concerned 
countries. 
 
e) The Tuna-Dolphin dispute 
In the early 1990s, while the Uruguay Round was still proceeding, the Tuna-Dolphin 
dispute arose.  




 were highly criticised 
not only by environmentalists
38
 but also by legal scholars
39
 for they suggested that 
economic sanctions could not be used in order to promote international environmen-
tal goals under the GATT. According to the panels, an importing country could not 
unilaterally force exporting countries to change their policies.
40
 The panel reports 
did, however, not discuss the balancing of rights of the countries concerned. 
The decisions led to the ‘widespread public concern that the GATT was a signifi-
cant obstacle to achieving environmental protection’.
41
 Hence, environmental protec-
tion suffered a setback whereas liberalisation of trade was reinforced. 
 
3. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WTO 
The development of the trade-environment relationship was pushed forward by the 
establishment of the WTO in 1994. 
Negotiations during the Uruguay Round showed the need for new institutional 
mechanisms and an improved dispute settlement system.
42
 As a result, the WTO was 
founded as an international organisation with legal personality, and a Dispute Set-
tlement Body (DSB) was introduced. Moreover, the WTO created the Committee for 
Trade and Environment (CTE). 
                                                 
36
 Tuna-Dolphin I. 
37
 Tuna-Dolphin II. 
38
 The World Trade Organisation ‘Environment: History’ (footnote 20); Ilona Cheyne ‘Trade and he 
Environment: the Future of Extraterritorial Unilateral Measures after the Shrimp Appellate Body’ 
(2000) 5 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues Introduction, available at 
http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2000/issue5/cheyne5.html, 18 January 2012. 
39
 See Robert Howse (footnote 9): The Tuna-Dolphin reports ‘were perhaps the most widely criticised 
rulings of any panels in the GATT’s history.’ 
40
 Tuna-Dolphin I para. 5.27-5.29, 5.32; Tuna-Dolphin II para. 5.26, 5.38. 
41
 Richard G. Tarasofsky ‘The WTO Committee on Trade and Environment: Is it making a Differ-
ence?‘ in Armin von Bogdandy et al (ed) Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (1999) page 
471 at 472. 
42













a) The WTO Agreements 
Whereas the GATT was only concerned with tariff reductions and concessions, the 
WTO also addresses other important trade-related issues such as the environment, 
agriculture, services, intellectual property and an effective dispute settlement.
43
  
The WTO was established by the Marrakesh Agreement. According to Article II 
(2) of the Marrakesh Agreement, the Members accept the Marrakesh Agreement to-
gether with all Multilateral Trade Agreements attached to it as single packge.
 44
 
Thereby, all agreements become binding on each WTO Member.  




Article XX of the GATT, for example, provides general exceptions through 
which Members can justify trade-restricting measures.
46
 In terms of environmental 
protection, Members can implement measures necessary to protect animal or plant 
life, pursuant to Article XX (b) of the GATT. In addition to that, Article XX (g) of 
the GATT allows measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural re-
sources. 
Other WTO Agreements also contain several provisions concerning environmen-
tal issues, including the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the TBT 
Agreement, the Agreement on Agriculture, the Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 




Besides that, the preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement points out the general 
significance of environmental protection and sustainable development. According to 
the preamble, Members must allow for 
‘the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective 
of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the 
environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent 
                                                 
43
 Mitsuo Matsushita (footnote 42) page 3, 7, 8. 
44
 Ibid page 7. 
45
 Ilona Cheyne (footnote 38) ‘Institutional Background’; Kevin C. Kennedy (footnote 27) at 394. 
46
 Petros C. Mavroidis et. al. The Law of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (2010) page 684. 
47
















The wording of the preamble resembles Principles 11, 12 and 16 of the Rio Dec-
laration. It recognises that environmental issues and sustainable development must be 




b) The dispute settlement system 
In addition to that, the WTO dispute settlement system encourages the balancing of 
trade promotion and environmental protection 
 
(i) The WTO DSB is much more powerful and effective than the GATT dispute 
settlement system was.  
Under the GATT, a panel could be established,
50
 but its rulings were not binding 
unless each party agreed to the panel report, also the party that lost the dispute. If the 
panel report had not been adopted by consensus, the decision had no binding legal 
effects and the party in violation of a GATT provision could not be forced to bring 
its measures into compliance with its obligations.
51
  
In contrast to that, WTO panel and Appellate Body reports are binding according 
to the principle of ‘reverse consensus’, that means the rulings are binding on all 
Members unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report.
52
 In addition 
to that, the DSU provides for the enforcement of the rulings by the WTO adjudicat-
ing body.
53
 If a Member in violation of its obligations does not comply with the rec-
ommendations and rulings of the DSB, any party that has invoked the dispute settle-




                                                 
48
 Paragraph 1 of the preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
49
 Ilona Cheyne (footnote 38) ‘Institutional Background’. 
50
 See Petros C. Mavroidis (footnote 46) page 886: Disputes could be submitted to a panel of experts 
who then issued a report to the contracting parties. 
51
 Petros C. Mavroidis (footnote 46) page 888. 
52
 Articles 16 (4) and 17 (14) of the Understanding on rules and procedures governing the settlement 
of disputes (Dispute Settlement Understanding – DSU); Mitsuo Matsushita (footnote 30) pages 116, 
117. 
53
 Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU. 
54












Moreover, the rulings by the Appellate Body (AB) are clearer and more con-
sistent since the AB is a standing body composed of seven permanent judges with 
respective expertise.
55
 Although its rulings are no binding interpretations or prece-
dents, subsequent panels or the AB usually refer to previous decisions and try to rule 
in line with the interpretation established beforehand.
56
 Thereby, the WTO adjudicat-
ing body interprets WTO law and guarantees legal certainty.
57
 
Thus, the WTO dispute settlement system is crucial for further developments of 
WTO law. Since trade negations have become more and more difficult and complex, 
particularly in terms of the trade-environment relationship, the dispute settlement 




(ii) Since the establishment of the WTO dispute settlement system, two important 
disputes concerning trade-restricting measures to protect the environment under the 
GATT have been decided: the Gasoline case
59
 and the Shrimp-Turtle case.
60
 Each 
decision deals with the justification of an environmental protection measure with 
trade restricting effects under Article XX (g) of the GATT.  
The AB in the Gasoline case in 1996 ruled in favour of the complainants stating 
that the measure at stake was inconsistent with the GATT. The AB found, after hav-
ing examined the rights of the US (the defendant) and the rights of other countries 
concerned,
61
 that the US applied rules to reduce air pollution in a way that discrimi-
nated against countries exporting gasoline to the US.
62
 Thus, the US measure violat-
ed Article III of the GATT and, although the measure was within the terms of para-
graph g, it could not be justified as it did not meet the requirements of the chapeau of 
Article XX of the GATT.
63
  
Two years later, in the Shrimp-Turtle case, the AB also found that the measure at 
stake was inconsistent with the GATT due to a violation of Article III of the GATT 
                                                 
55
 Article 17 (1) and (3) of the DSU; Ilona Cheyne (footnote 38) ‘Institutional Background’. 
56
 Mitsuo Matsushita (footnote 42) pages 111, 112. 
57
 Petros C. Mavroidis (footnote 46) pages 905, 910. 
58
 Ilona Cheyne (footnote 38) ‘Institutional Background’. 
59
 Appellate Body Report on United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline 




 Gasoline pages 22 et seq. 
62
 Gasoline pages 28, 29. 
63












that could not be justified under the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT. Pursuant to 




However, in both decisions the AB made clear that environmental protection was 
an important interest of the WTO Members.
65
 It recognised that Article XX of the 
GATT contained exceptions to other GATT rules and that neither of the Members’ 
rights under the GATT should be ruled out.
66
 Moreover, the Gasoline AB report 
highlighted that policies on trade and on the environment had to be coordinated.
67
 




Hence, the AB recognised the principles of both the balancing of rights and in-
ternational cooperation in terms of the trade-environment relationship. 
 
c) The WTO Committee for Trade and Environment 
The WTO Committee for Trade and Environment is the successor of the EMIT.
69
 
The CTE examines trade-environment conflicts. It is supposed to recommend so-
lutions to issues listed in its work program.
70
 However, it has been criticised since it 
has not reached much progress and concrete results yet.
71
 In the CTE’s 1996 progress 
report,
72
 for example, it merely supported multilateral solutions to trade concerns 
with a view to Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration. In terms of the relationship be-
tween environmental protection measures with trade-restricting effects and provi-




                                                 
64
 Shrimp-Turtle para. 176, 184. 
65
 Gasoline pages 29, 30; Shrimp-Turtle para. 185. 
66
 Gasoline pages 22 et seq; Shrimp-Turtle paras. 156 et seq. 
67
 Gasoline page 30. 
68
 Shrimp-Turtle para. 185. 
69
 Ilona Cheyne (footnote 38) ‘Institutional Background’; Kevin C. Kennedy (footnote 27) at 422. 
70
 Kevin C. Kennedy (footnote 27) at 422. 
71
 Ilona Cheyne (footnote 38) ‘Institutional Background’. 
72
 Report (1996) of the Committee on Trade and Environment, WT/CTE/1. 
73












Recent discussions in the CTE focus on environmental requirements and market 




4. CURRENT STATUS 
At the present, the relationship between international trade and measures to protect 
the environment plays a central role within the WTO.  
The trade-environment relation is one of the main areas of negotiation of the cur-
rent Doha Round that has been on-going since 2001. It is said that if the Doha Round 
can be brought to a conclusion, it will lead to new provisions dealing with environ-
mental protection.
75
 However, a conclusion is not yet in sight. 
As long as negotiations do not result in binding solutions, the WTO adjudicatory 






In conclusion, although environmental protection on the interface to international 
trade has been promoted since the early 1970s, efficient mechanisms to combine pol-
icies on trade and on environmental protection have only been introduced with the 
establishment of the WTO in 1995.  
Since the WTO Members do not seem to be able to reach consensus in this re-
gard, it is the role of the WTO adjudicating body to assess trade-restricting measures 
to protect the environment. 
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III. WTO/GATT JURISPRUDENCE: THE TUNA-DOLPHIN AND 
SHRIMP-TURTLE DISPUTES 
Several cases dealing with environmental concerns have been brought before the 
WTO/GATT adjudicating body. The two most important disputes in terms of unilat-
eral measures with extraterritorial effect to protect the environment are the Tuna-
Dolphin and Shrimp-Turtle disputes that are outlined and compared herein. The out-
line concentrates on the arguments and findings regarding the unilateral implementa-
tion of measures with extraterritorial effect in connection with Article XX (g) of the 
GATT. 
 
1. THE TUNA-DOLPHIN DISPUTE 




In 1991, Mexico requested a panel in response to a tuna import embargo by the 
United States pursuant to the US Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) which 
intended to protect and conserve marine mammals.
78
 The panel report (Tuna-Dolphin 
I) was circulated but not adopted. Therefore, it was not legally binding.
79
 In 1994, a 
second panel report (Tuna-Dolphin II) was circulated due to a panel request by the 
European Union (EU) and the Netherlands regarding import embargoes in connec-
tion with the same act. However, that report was not adopted and binding, either. Tu-
na-Dolphin II upheld some of the findings of Tuna-Dolphin I and modified others. 
Therefore, the following outline concentrates on Tuna-Dolphin II. 
 
a) Factual aspects 
In the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean, schools of yellowfin tuna could regularly be 
found swimming below schools of dolphins. Catching the tuna with purse seine nets 
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The MMPA prohibited the taking of marine mammals, whether directly or inci-
dentally, by any person or vessel within the jurisdiction of the US or within any area 
over which the US had jurisdiction.
81
 However, the MMPA provided for a permit to 
take marine mammals incidentally to commercial fishing operations.
82
 The American 
Tunaboat Association was the only recipient of such a permit.
83
 
Moreover, according to the MMPA, the US government had to impose an import 
ban regarding tuna caught by a method that led to the incidental killing or serious 
injury of dolphins in excess of US standards (primary nation embargo).
84
 In other 
words, exporting countries had to meet the dolphin protection standards of the US in 
terms of both fishing technology and the rate of incidental takings. In terms of yel-
lowfin tuna from the eastern tropical pacific, Section 101 (a)(2)(B) of the MMPA set 
out specific requirements. An exception to the primary nation embargo applied 




Further, a country that exported yellowfin tuna or tuna products to the US and 
had imported yellowfin tuna or tuna products that were subject to a direct import ban 
had to certify that it had not had imported such tuna or tuna products in the previous 
six months (intermediary nation embargo).
86
 The respective provision had been 
amended in October 1992. Due to the changed provision, France, the Netherlands 
Antilles and the United Kingdom were removed from the list of intermediary nations, 




b) Legal issues 
The EU and the Netherlands (hereinafter: the complainants) argued that both the in-
termediary and the primary nation embargoes were inconsistent with Article XI of 
the GATT, which prohibited quantitative import restrictions.
 88
 Moreover, according 
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to the complainants, the embargoes violated the national treatment principle con-
tained in Article III and Note ad Article III of the GATT.
89
 




According to the US, on the other hand, the intermediary nation embargo was 
justified under Article XX (g), (b), and (d) of the GATT.
91
 
Moreover, the US argued that the primary nation embargo did not apply to the 
complainants. The primary nation embargo would further be justified under Article 




c) The panel’s findings 
(i) The panel first found that the import embargoes violated the national treatment 
principle contained in Article III of the GATT.  
According to the panel, Article III of the GATT applied to domestic measures in 
case of a law ‘which applie[d] to an imported product and to the like domestic prod-
uct and [was] […] enforced in the case of the imported product at the time or point of 
importation’.
93
 Moreover, pursuant to Article III:4 of the GATT, a country could not 
treat an imported product less favourable than a like domestic product.
94
 
The panel proceeded by stating that Note ad Article III of the GATT justified 
the enforcement of an internal law that was applied equally to the imported product 
and the like domestic product. However, according to the panel, the provision did not 
apply if the enforcement related to policies that did not refer to the product as such 
and that led to a less favourable treatment of ‘like products not produced in conform-
ity with the domestic policies of the importing country’.
95
 
The panel concluded that Note ad Article III of the GATT did not apply in the 
present case since the measures at stake did not refer to the product as such: The im-
port embargoes distinguished between methods of catching tuna and import policies. 
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The measures in terms of domestic tuna likewise distinguished between catching 




(ii) Secondly, the panel found that the import embargoes violated Article XI:1 




(iii) The panel proceeded with its main point stating that the import embar-
goes could not be justified under paragraph g and the chapeau of Article XX of the 
GATT. 
The panel applied a three-step analysis determining first whether the policy at 
stake fell within the scope of policies to conserve exhaustible natural resources, se-
cond whether the particular measure related to the conservation of exhaustible natu-
ral resources and whether it was made effective in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption, and third whether the measure was not applied 
in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimina-
tion. 
According to the panel, a policy to conserve dolphins fell within the scope of 
policies to conserve exhaustible natural resources since dolphins could potentially be 
exhausted. The panel stated that dolphin stocks did not have to be depleted at the 
time of the policy.
98
 Moreover, the exhaustible resources did not have to be located 
within the jurisdiction of the country implementing the measure: The panel found 
that the text of paragraph g and the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT did not re-
quire the policy to be limited to a certain area.
99
 Further, two previous panels had ap-
plied the provision to policies that had an impact on resources within and outside of 
the respective country’s jurisdiction.
100
 In addition to that, according to the panel, the 
GATT did not, in principle, prohibit measures relating to things or conduct outside of 
the jurisdiction of the country implementing the measure.
101
 Also, the panel held that 
general international law did not, in principle, proscribe measures regulating conduct 
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of a country’s nationals or vessels, including any persons on these vessels, with re-
spect to persons or things outside of their territory.
102
  Lastly, the panel explained 
that environmental and trade treaties other than the GATT could be used as supple-
mentary means to interpret Article XX (g) of the GATT pursuant to Article 32 of the 
VCLT.
103
 However, these treaties were only of limited assistance in the present case 
since the GATT did not include any direct reference to these treaties. Moreover, the 
material presented to the panel did not provide a clear answer to the question whether 
the resources in Article XX (g) of the GATT had to be located within the jurisdiction 
of the respective country.
104
 
In terms of the second step of the panel’s three-step analysis, the panel found that 
the primary and intermediary nation embargoes were neither related to the conserva-
tion of dolphins nor made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic pro-
duction or consumption within the meaning of Article XX (g) of the GATT.
105
 
According to the panel’s reference to a previous panel, the term ‘relating to’ 
meant ‘primarily aimed’ at the conservation and the term ‘in conjunction with’ meant 




The panel proceeded by stating that neither the intermediary nor the primary na-
tion embargo could, by itself, promote the US goal of dolphin conservation:
107
 In 
terms of the intermediary nation embargo, imports were banned regardless of an ac-
tual harm to dolphins and regardless of the intermediary nation’s harvesting policies 
and methods. The import ban was triggered by the fact alone that the intermediary 
nation imported tuna from a country with fishing policies and methods different from 
the US’ policies.
108
 In terms of the primary nation embargo, the panel found that tuna 
imports were banned regardless of an actual harm for dolphins, due to the mere fact 
that the exporting country had different policies and methods than the US.
109
 
According to the panel, the intermediary and primary nation embargoes could 
only promote dolphin protection in case the embargoes led to a change of other coun-
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tries’ policies with regard to persons and things within their own jurisdiction.
110
 The 
panel then examined whether Article XX (g) of the GATT included measures im-
plemented to force exporting countries to change their policies with regard to persons 
or things within their own jurisdiction and that demanded such changes to be effec-
tive.
111
 According to the panel, the wording of Article XX (g) of the GATT did not 
provide a solution to that problem.
112
 Considering the object and purpose of the 
GATT, the panel stated that Article XX of the GATT had to be interpreted narrowly 
since it contained exceptions to the obligations under the GATT.
113
 According to the 
panel, the balance of the rights and obligations would be afflicted if Article XX of 
the GATT permitted measures implemented to force exporting countries to change 
their policies within their own jurisdiction.
114
 In conclusion, the panel found that 
measures which had been implemented to force other countries to change their poli-
cies and which would only be effective if such changes occurred, were not primarily 
aimed at the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource or at rendering effective 
the restrictions on domestic production or consumption.
115
 In other words, a measure 
that required other countries to change their policies and that’s protective goal could 
only be achieved if the other country actually changed its policy, did not fall under 
the term ‘primarily aimed at’. Thus, the requirements of Article XX (g) of the GATT 
were not fulfilled. 
Since the second step requirements were not fulfilled, the panel refrained from 
examining the third step, namely the conditions of the chapeau of Article XX of the 
GATT.
116
 In conclusion, according to the panel, the import bans violated Article XI 
of the GATT and could not be justified under Article XX (g) of the GATT. 
 
(iv) The panel proceeded by examining whether the import bans could be justi-
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First, it determined whether the policy at stake fell within the scope of policies 
referred to in Article XX (b) of the GATT. As with Article XX (g) of the GATT, the 
text of Article XX (b) did not require that the protected animals had to be located 
within the jurisdiction of the country implementing the measure at stake.
118
 Moreo-
ver, the panel recalled its arguments that neither the GATT nor general international 
law prohibited measures relating to things located outside of a country’s territory.
119
 
Further, the panel held that environmental and trade treaties other than the GATT 
were irrelevant and that the materials provided by the parties did not give a clear an-
swer to the question whether the protected dolphins had to be situated within the re-
spective country’s territory.
120
 Thus, according to the panel, the policy at stake fell 
within the scope of Article XX (b) of the GATT. 
Secondly, the panel examined whether the import embargoes were necessary to 
protect the dolphins. It found that the term ‘necessary’ meant that no measure con-
sistent with other GATT provision was reasonably available and that the measure 
chosen out of all measures reasonably available was least inconsistent with other 
GATT provisions.
121
 As with its argumentation under Article XX (g) of the GATT, 
the panel stated that neither the primary nor the intermediary nation embargoes by 
themselves could lead to dolphin conservation.
122
 The panel proceeded by examining 
whether Article XX (b) of the GATT included measures implemented to force other 
countries to change their policies within their own jurisdictions and that demanded 
such changes to be effective.
123
 It concluded, recalling its reasoning under Arti-
cle XX (g) of the GATT, that the objectives of the GATT would be seriously dam-
aged if such measures fell under the provision containing exceptions.
124
 Hence, the 
measure could not be considered necessary to protect dolphins.
125
 
As with Article XX (g) of the GATT, the panel refrained from examining the re-
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(v) The panel then examined whether the intermediary nation embargo was justi-
fied under Article XX (d) of the GATT. It found, however, that there was no basis 
for a justification of the intermediary nation embargo since the primary nation em-




(vi) Lastly, the panel made clear that the parties to the GATT had widely recog-
nised the objective of sustainable development but that the parties had not agreed to 




(vii) The panel concluded by stating that the import bans under the MMPA were 




2. THE SHRIMP-TURTLE DISPUTE 
The Shrimp-Turtle dispute was decided by the WTO Appellate Body in 1998, four 
years after Tuna-Dolphin II.  
India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand requested a panel in response to an im-
port ban by the United States pursuant to Section 609 of Public Law 101-162
130
 (Sec-
tion 609), a provision to protect sea turtles in the course of harvesting shrimp. After 
the panel report had been circulated, the US appealed. The report by the AB was 
binding on all Members.
131
 
The AB’s interpretation of paragraph g and the chapeau of Article XX of the 
GATT differed in substantive points from Tuna-Dolphin II. The following outline 
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a) Factual aspects 
Under the Endangered Species Act (ESA),
132
 US shrimp trawl vessels were required 
to use approved Turtle Excluder Devices (TEDs) when harvesting shrimp in areas 
with a significant mortality of sea turtles related to shrimp fishing.
133
 That rule was 
subject to limited exceptions.  
Section 609 dealt with the importation of shrimp into the US. According to this 
provision, the US should, inter alia, enter into negotiations with other shrimp harvest-
ing countries in order to conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements concerning the 
protection and conservation of sea turtles.
134
 Moreover, Section 609 prohibited the 
import of shrimp that was caught with a technology that might adversely affect sea 
turtles unless the exporting country was certified.
135
 A country could get a certifica-
tion if its fishing environment did not threaten sea turtles, e.g. because sea turtles did 
not occur in the country’s waters, or if the country had a regulatory program and its 
average rate of incidental sea turtle takings was comparable to that of the US.
136
 The 
regulatory program had to include the mandatory use of TEDs ‘comparable in effec-
tiveness to those used in the United States’
137
 and an effective enforcement effort.
138
 
According to the 1996 Guidelines,
139
 shrimp caught in all foreign countries
140
 
could only be imported to the US if it had been caught either in the waters of a certi-
fied country or ‘under conditions that [did] not adversely affect sea turtles’.
141
 In 




The panel report stated that the import ban was inconsistent with Article XI:1 of 
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b) Legal issues 
According to the US, Section 609 was justified under Article XX (g) and (b) of the 
GATT, particularly since it did not pose an unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevailed.
144
 
The appellees, on the other hand, argued that Section 609 violated Article XI:1 of 
the GATT and was not justified under Article XX (g) or (b) of the GATT, especially 




The panel found that Section 609 was not within the scope of measures permitted 
by the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT since it constituted an unjustifiable dis-
crimination.
146
 According to the panel, the measure would undermine the WTO mul-
tilateral trading system by conditioning access to the US market upon the implemen-




c) The Appellate Body’s findings 
(i) First of all, the AB reversed the panel’s finding that Section 609 was not within 
the scope of measures permitted under the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT.
148
  
According to the AB, which referred to the Gasoline case, the justification under 
Article XX of the GATT had to be examined in two steps. First, the measure itself 
had to fall within the scope of one of the paragraphs of Article XX of the GATT. 
Secondly, the measure had to be applied in a manner consistent with the chapeau of 
Article XX of the GATT.
149
 
The AB found that a measure, which unilaterally conditioned access to the im-
porting country’s market upon the implementation of certain policies by exporting 
countries, could fall within the scope of one of the paragraphs of Article XX of the 
GATT.
150
 A measure that required a change of policies of foreign countries did not 
necessarily drop out of the scope of Article XX of the GATT since the policies un-
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derlying such measures had been recognised as important and legitimate by the para-




(ii) The AB proceeded by examining the requirements of paragraph g of Article 
XX of the GATT. 
First, the AB clarified that sea turtles were exhaustible natural resources. The 
text of paragraph g did not limit the provision to the conservation of mineral or non-
living natural resources.
152
 Also, according to the AB, the fact that a resource was 
renewable, or in terms of living resources reproductive, did not preclude that this re-
source could become exhausted.
153
 In addition to that, the term natural resource had 
to be interpreted in the light of the Marrakesh Agreement which, in its preamble, 
recognised the objective of sustainable development.
154
 Further, the AB considered 
other current international conventions and declarations that included living re-
sources as natural resources.
155
 Therefore, in the light of recent international frame-
works, the term natural resources in Article XX (g) of the GATT included both living 
and non-living natural resources.
156
 Moreover, the AB stated that sea turtles were 
listed as species threatened with extinction in the Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and were therefore ex-
haustible.
157
 Furthermore, the AB found that sea turtles could be exhaustible natural 
resources within the meaning of paragraph g of Article XX of the GATT although 
they were highly migratory passing through the waters of several countries and the 
high sea.
158
 According to the AB, there was a ‘sufficient nexus’ between the endan-
gered sea turtles and the US since the sea turtle species at stake could be found in 
waters over which the US had jurisdiction.
159
 However, the AB explicitly did not de-
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Secondly, the AB examined if the measure at stake related to, i.e. was primarily 
aimed at, the conservation of sea turtles.
161
 Analysing the relationship between the 
general structure and design of Section 609 and its objective to conserve sea turtles, 
which was a legitimate policy goal,
162
 the AB found that Section 609 was fairly nar-
rowly focused.
163
 According to the AB, the provision influenced exporting countries 
to implement sea turtle friendly policies.
164
 Section 609 did not prohibit the importa-
tion of shrimp absolutely but contained exceptions where shrimp fishing did not pose 
an actual threat to sea turtles.
165
 Thus, according to the AB, considering the general 
design and structure, the measure was not disproportionately wide in its scope and 
was reasonable related to the policy goal.
166
 Hence, the AB found that Section 609 
related to the conservation of sea turtles within the meaning of paragraph g of Arti-
cle XX of the GATT. 
Thirdly, the AB found that the measure at stake also was made effective in con-
junction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption:
167
 US shrimp 
trawl vessels had to use TEDs when harvesting shrimp in areas with a significant 
mortality of sea turtles subject to limited exceptions. This obligation could be en-
forced by civil and criminal sanctions. Hence, according to the AB, the Section 609 
was even-handed in the imposition of restrictions.
168
 
Since the AB found that the measure at stake was within the scope of para-





(iii) The AB then examined whether Section 609 fell under the chapeau of Arti-
cle XX of the GATT. 
 
First, the AB made clear that a measure that fell within the scope of paragraph g 
could still be unjustifiable due to a violation of the chapeau.
170
 The AB continued 
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with remarks on the objective of the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT which was 
to prevent an abuse of the exceptions. The relevant measure had to be applied in a 
reasonable way taking into account both the obligations of the country implementing 
the measure and the rights of the other countries concerned.
171
 The right of a country 
to invoke an exception and the obligation of that country to respect the rights of other 
countries needed to be balanced.
172
 In this regard, the AB outlined the role of the en-
vironment in international trade. On the one hand, the preamble of the Marrakesh 
Agreement mentioned sustainable development as one of the objectives of the WTO. 
According to the AB, the GATT provisions had to be interpreted against the back-
drop of this objective.
173
 On the other hand, the AB took into account that the Deci-
sion of Ministers in Marrakesh voted in to establish the CTE and took notice of the 
Rio Declaration and Agenda 21.
174
 The AB then found that the chapeau of Arti-
cle XX of the GATT incorporated the principle of good faith which, inter alia, pro-
hibited the abuse of rights by states.
175
 According to the AB, states had to exercise 
their rights in a reasonable way.
176
 The AB concluded its general considerations by 
stating that the chapeau needed to be interpreted and applied in a way that balanced 
the right of one state to invoke an exception and the rights of the other states under 




The AB then examined whether Section 609 was applied in a manner constitut-
ing an unjustifiable discrimination. 
The AB began by noticing that the way in which Section 609 was applied in con-
junction with the 1996 Guidelines and the practice of administrators had a coercive 
effect on exporting countries requiring them to implement essentially the same policy 
as the US:
178
 Other than the text of Section 609 suggested, exporting countries, in 
practice, only received a certification to export shrimp to the US if they applied not 
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merely a comparable but rather essentially the same policy.
179
 Thereby, according to 
the AB, the US imposed a rigid standard disregarding other comparable protective 
policies by exporting countries. The AB found that, although a country might apply a 
single standard throughout its territory, it could not do so with regard to other coun-
tries. In international trade relations, a country had to consider different conditions 
occurring on other countries’ territory.
180
 Moreover, the US imposed an import ban 
even where countries used the same fishing methods as those required in the US just 
because the shrimp had been harvested in waters of non-certified countries.
181
 In that 
situation, according to the AB, Section 609 was not applied to further the protection 
and conservation of sea turtles but rather to influence foreign countries policies. The 
AB found that a measure resulted in discrimination where its application did not 
permit to examine whether a policy was appropriate considering the prevailing con-
ditions in foreign countries.
182
 
In addition to that, the AB ruled that Section 609 was applied in a discriminatory 
way since the US failed to enter into serious negotiations with several exporting 
countries before imposing the import ban although the text of Section 609 provided 
for such negotiations.
183
 According to the AB, the US would have been obliged to 
reach international agreements with exporting countries or at least to seriously at-
tempt reaching such agreements.
184
 Furthermore, the AB found that international co-




According to the AB, cooperative efforts were necessary and appropriate and this 
had been recognised by the WTO and other international institutions. The AB re-
ferred to, inter alia, Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration and paragraph 2.22(i) of 
Agenda 21 stating that transborder environmental issues should, as far as possible, be 
addressed by internationally agreed measures.
186
 Further, the CTE found in one of its 
reports that multilaterally solutions arising out of international cooperation and con-
sensus constituted the best and most effective means to address transboundary or 
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 Also, the AB found that the US itself acknowledged 
the availability and feasibility of consensual and multilateral solutions to further the 
conservation of sea turtles by signing the Inter-American Convention for the 
Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles (Inter-American Convention).
188
 The par-
ties to the convention agreed upon implementing appropriate and necessary measures 
to protect and conserve sea turtles. Moreover, they reaffirmed their obligations under 
the WTO, particularly under Article XI of the GATT.
189
 Thus, the Inter-American 
Convention balanced the parties’ rights and obligations arising out of the WTO 
Agreement.
190
 The AB held that, although the US could further its legitimate policy 
goal by way of multilateral and consensual measures, it chose an import ban which 
was the most restricting trade measure.
191
 The US did not make any serious efforts to 
negotiate agreements with countries other than the parties to the Inter-American 
Convention, neither before enforcing Section 609 nor before imposing the import 
ban. The AB found that negotiating with some but not all exporting countries consti-
tuted an unjustifiable discrimination.
192
 The failure to negotiate bilateral or multilat-
eral agreements, although Section 609 provided for such negotiations, led to unilat-
erism excluding participation by exporting countries.
193
 According to the AB, ‘the 
unilateral character of the application of Section 609 heighten[ed] the disruptive and 




The application of Section 609 was further discriminatory since, due to a change 
of guidelines, some countries in the wider Caribbean/western Atlantic region had 
three years to implement the requirement of the use of TEDs whereas all other ex-
porting countries only had four months for doing so to receive a certification.
195
 The 
AB found that the shorter the implementation period was, the heavier the influence 
of the import ban weighed.
196
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Lastly, the AB observed that the US put far greater effort in the transfer of the 
required TED technology to the wider Caribbean/western Atlantic countries than to 
other exporting countries.
197
 Less effort in TED technology transfer led to fewer 
countries meeting the certification requirements set out in Section 609. 
Hence, the AB held, the cumulative effect of the different treatments of various 
exporting countries constituted an unjustifiable discrimination within the meaning of 




In addition to that, according to the AB, Section 609 had been applied in a way 
leading to an arbitrary discrimination: Section 609 was applied in a single, rigid and 
unbending way. Further, the AB found that the determination for certification was 
inflexible.
199
 Moreover, according to the AB, the certification process of the US was 
intransparent and unpredictable without any formal opportunity for exporting coun-
tries to be heard or to appeal and without a formal written, reasoned decision.
200
 
There was no guarantee that Section 609 and the 1996 Guidelines were being applied 
in a fair and just way. The principles of basic fairness and due process were disre-
garded, and exporting countries that did not receive a certification were discriminat-
ed against in comparison to exporting countries that did receive a certification.
201
 
Thereby, the US also violated Article X:3 of the GATT setting out minimum re-
quirements in terms of transparency and procedural fairness.
202
 These circumstances 




(iv) The AB made clear that it was important to WTO Members to protect and 
preserve the environment. Further, according to the AB, WTO Members as sovereign 
states had the power to implement measures to protect endangered species and 
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(v) The AB concluded by stating that although Section 609 was legitimate under 
paragraph g of Article XX of the GATT, its application was inconsistent with the 
chapeau and could therefore not be justified. 
 
3. COMPARISON OF THE TUNA-DOLPHIN AND SHRIMP-TURTLE DISPUTES 
Although both decisions found that the measures at stake violated the GATT, their 
reasoning differed in substantive parts. In other parts, the AB report elaborated on 
points already made by the Tuna-Dolphin panel. 
 
a) The notion of ‘exhaustible natural resources’ 
Both decisions held that living natural resources and resources located outside of the 
country implementing the measure at stake fell under the term ‘exhaustible natural 
resources’ within the meaning of paragraph g of Article XX of the GATT.  
The Tuna-Dolphin panel stated that dolphins could potentially become exhausted 
and that it was not necessary that their stocks had already been depleted at the time 
of the policy.
205
 Moreover, according to the panel, the exhaustible natural resource at 




The Shrimp-Turtle report clarified this point by interpreting the term ‘exhaustible 
natural resource’ pursuant to general rules of interpretation. In particular, the AB 
pointed out that the pr amble of the Marrakesh Agreement recognized the objective 
of sustainable development and that also other recent international conventions pro-
tecting natural resources included living resources.
207
 
In contrast to the situation in the Tuna-Dolphin dispute, the resources at stake in 
Shrimp-Turtle were threatened with extinction according to the CITES. The AB used 
this as another argument for its finding that sea turtles were exhaustible.
208
 
Another difference between the two cases was that the sea turtles in Shrimp-
Turtle were highly migratory. The AB found that there was a ‘sufficient nexus’ be-
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tween the migratory sea turtles and the US.
209
 However, it did not make any findings 





b) The notion of ‘relating to’ and ‘in conjunction with’ 
The key difference between the two disputes lies in the interpretation of the terms 
‘relating to’ and ‘in conjunction with’ in paragraph g of Article XX of the GATT. 
Both decisions noticed that ‘relating to’ meant primarily aimed at the conserva-
tion of exhaustible natural resources.
211
 However, they came to different conclusions. 
Tuna-Dolphin found that the measures at stake could not, by themselves, further 
the policy goal.
212
 According to the panel, paragraph g of Article XX of the GATT 
did not include measures which were implemented to force other countries to change 
their policies regarding resources within their own jurisdiction and which required 
such changes to be effective.
213
 Therefore, the measures were neither primarily 
aimed at the conservation of exhaustible natural resources nor primarily aimed at 
rendering effective domestic restrictions on their production or consumption. 
In contrast to that, Shrimp-Turtle held that although the measure at stake was de-
signed to influence countries to change their own policies, it was fairly narrowly fo-
cused and thereby not disproportionately wide and reasonably related to the policy 
goal.
214
 Thus, according to the AB, the measure was related to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources. Moreover, the AB found that the measure was made 
effective in conjunction with the restrictions on domestic production or consumption 
since the measure was even-handed in the imposition of restrictions.
215
 
As a result, the panel in Tuna-Dolphin held that the measure at stake was incon-
sistent with paragraph g of Article XX of the GATT whereas the AB in Shrimp-
Turtle stated that the requirements of paragraph g were fulfilled by the measure. 
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c) The chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 
The Tuna-Dolphin panel did not have to examine the requirements of the chapeau of 
Article XX of the GATT since, according to its opinion, the measures at stake did not 
fall under any of the paragraphs of Article XX of the GATT. 
In contrast to that, the AB in Shrimp-Turtle held that the measure at stake had 
been applied in a way inconsistent with the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT as it 
posed an unjustified and arbitrary discrimination. 
In the end, both decisions found that the measures at stake could not be justified 













IV. THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE XX (G) OF THE GATT IN 
SHRIMP-TURTLE 
In order to assess the legality of unilateral measures with extraterritorial effect to pro-
tect the environment under the WTO/GATT, the Shrimp-Turtle decision must be dis-
cussed in the context of international law. What first needs to be analysed is the AB’s 
interpretation of Article XX (g) of the GATT. 
 
1. THE NOTION OF ‘SUFFICIENT NEXUS’ 
The AB started by examining the requirements of paragraph g before it considered 
the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT.
216
 When interpreting the term ‘exhaustible 
natural resource’ within the meaning of Article XX (g) of the GATT, the AB found 
that there was a ‘sufficient nexus’ between the endangered sea turtles and the US as 
the country implementing the protective measure. Thus, although not explicitly men-
tioned in paragraph g of Article XX of the GATT, the AB required a certain link be-
tween the policy to conserve exhaustible natural resources and the interests of the 
country implementing the protective measure.
217
 Only if such a link or nexus was 
present, the measure at stake could fall within the scope of policies to conserve ex-
haustible natural resources. 
The AB did not give any standards or guidelines for determining what a suffi-
cient nexus was. Therefore, it needs to be analysed when there is a sufficient nexus 
and how this criterion should be handled by the WTO adjudicating body in the fu-
ture. 
 
a) The WTO jurisprudence 
First of all, WTO jurisprudence has to be examined.  
As can be inferred from the Shrimp-Turtle decision, the AB found a sufficient 
nexus because, although the sea turtles were highly migratory and the US could not 
claim exclusive ownership over them, all of the sea turtle species at stake occurred in 
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waters over which the US had jurisdiction.
218
 Hence, the US had a sufficient interest 
to protect the sea turtles. Apart from that, the AB deliberately avoided the question of 
whether paragraph g of Article XX of the GATT contained any jurisdictional limita-
tions.
219
 It only stated that there was a sufficient nexus between the migratory and 
endangered sea turtles and the country implementing the protective measure.  
So far, there has been no other dispute before the WTO adjudicating body deal-
ing with the trade-environment relationship and Article XX (g) of the GATT. There-




b) The wording 
To define the term ‘sufficient nexus’, one must determine its meaning in common 
parlance. 
The AB required a sufficient nexus between the exhaustible natural resource and 
the country implementing the protective measure. ‘Nexus’ means that there has to be 
a certain type of connection, link or relationship between these two points.
221
 How-
ever, it cannot be any connection, link or relationship. It has to be a ‘sufficient’ one. 
The term ‘sufficient’ narrows the nexus requirement down only slightly though, 
since the AB did not state what kind of nexus had to be sufficient. Sufficient means 
substantial or reasonable,
222
 but it is uncertain in which regard the nexus must be 
substantial or reasonable. The question is what the nature of the sufficient nexus is. 
This question cannot b  answered by looking at the wording but by taking into ac-
count the object and purpose of the sufficient-nexus requirement. 
 
c) The object and purpose 
It needs to be examined what kind of nexus the AB targeted at. 
It can be inferred from the AB’s remark that it did not decide on the question 
whether or not paragraph g of Article XX of the GATT contained any jurisdictional 
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limitations or on the nature and extent of these limitations, that the nature of the nex-
us is not a jurisdictional one.
223
 If the AB had required a sufficient jurisdictional nex-
us, it would actually have recognised a jurisdictional limitation: paragraph g would 
only include exhaustible natural resources that were linked to the territory over 
which the country implementing the protection measure exercised jurisdiction. In 
contrast to that, the Shrimp-Turtle decision explicitly stated that it did not pass upon 
the question of jurisdictional limitations. What also argues against a jurisdictional 
nature of the nexus is the following consideration: If the nexus was jurisdictional and 
the resource had to be linked to the territory of the country implementing the meas-
ure at issue, that would mean that measures with extraterritorial effect would be pro-
hibited generally, with the only exception of migratory resources.
224
 That would, 
however, make the scope of paragraph g of Article XX of the GATT unreasonably 
narrow. In contrast to that, the Shrimp-Turtle decision has mostly been interpreted as 




 The view that exhaustible natu-
ral resources do not have to be within the territory of the country adopting the protec-
tive measure is also in line with the Tuna-Dolphin panel report. The panel report 
stated that the resource at issue did not have to be located within the jurisdiction of 
the country implementing the measure.
227
 The panel based this finding on general 
rules of treaty interpretation, namely the wording of Article XX (g) of the GATT, 
findings of previous panels, other provisions of the GATT, and principles of general 
international law.
 228
 Hence, the resource to be conserved does not have to be situated 
within the territory over which the country implementing the measure exercises ju-
risdiction for constituting a sufficient nexus and the nexus is not jurisdictional in na-
ture. 
Rather, the sufficient nexus requirement appears to be based on the exploitability 
of the resource by the country that adopts the measure to conserve the resource:
229
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According to the AB, the US as the country implementing the protective measure 
had no exclusive ownership over the migrating sea turtles but it was sufficient that 
the sea turtle species at issue occurred in US waters.
230
 Thus, the AB required some 
sort of control over the resource. If a country does not own the resource at stake and 
the resource is also not permanently located within its territory, the country can still 
exercise control by means of exploitation. Exploitation in this sense includes the pre-
vention of potential extinction in order to insure comprehensive protection of ex-
haustible natural resources under Article XX (g) of the GATT.
 231
 If a country ex-
ploits a resource by adopting measures to conserve it, it has a sufficient nexus to the 
resource. What supports this view is that a state which exploits a resource has a pro-
tective interest that is comparable to its domestic interests which are unquestionably 
protected by Article XX of the GATT.
232
 The view that the sufficient nexus is based 
on exploitation is also in line with the nature of the GATT as an international trade 
agreement. When countries trade in certain goods including natural resources, they 
exploit these goods. Thus, exploitability is an appropriate basis for a sufficient nexus 
between a country implementing a protective measure and a resource under Article 




For a measure to fall within the scope of paragraph g of Article XX of the GATT, the 
resource protected by the measure must have a sufficient nexus with the implement-
ing country. The nexus has to be based on exploitability of the resource by the coun-
try adopting the protective measure. The question where such a nexus is sufficient 
needs to be determined by the WTO adjudicating body on a case-by-case basis taking 
into account the specific circumstances of each case.
233
 One example of a sufficient 
nexus that the Shrimp-Turtle AB report gave was that of a resource that was, if not 
necessarily permanently, situated within the territory of the country implementing the 
measure.
234
 However, that is no mandatory criterion. 
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2. THE NOTION OF ‘SERIOUS ATTEMPT’ 
In its Shrimp-Turtle decision, the AB found that the measure at stake was incon-
sistent with the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT since, inter alia, the US had 
failed to ‘seriously attempt’ reaching international agreements with all shrimp ex-
porting countries. Thus, the measure was applied in a way that posed an unjustifiable 
discrimination.
235
 Yet, it is unclear when an attempt can be deemed serious. It is par-
ticularly unclear in how far the country that wants to implement a measure has to of-




The AB’s remarks in its Shrimp-Turtle decision need to be analysed and searched 
for criteria of the serious-attempt requirement. 
 
a) The quality of negotiations  
The AB found that the US had to enter into serious negotiations with affected coun-
tries before implementing the protective measure unilaterally.
237
 According to the 
AB, the US had to seek for international consensus. International consensus did not 
have to be reached but only attempted. 
238
 The fact that the attempt had to be serious, 
however, implied that there had to be actual room for negotiations and that not only 
one outcome was preconceived.
239
 Otherwise, the negotiations would not have been 
serious but rather fictitious. 
 
b) The interests to consider 
When examining the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT, the 
AB balanced the rights of the country that wanted to implement the environmental 
protection measure and the substantive rights of all other countries concerned under 
the GATT.
240
 In this context, according to the AB, the US had to negotiate and coop-
erate with all shrimp exporting countries in order to show regard for the other coun-
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tries’ rights. Against this backdrop, a ‘serious, across-the-board negotiation’
241
 re-
quires to consider the interests of all negotiating parties involved. 
In addition to that, the country that wants to adopt an environmental protection 
measure must not only take into account other countries’ rights under the GATT but 
also other interests of the countries concerned. For example, in the Shrimp-Turtle 
dispute, the negotiations failed due to a disagreement regarding the allocation of the 
costs of implementing the US policies.
242
 As can be inferred from the Shrimp-Turtle 
decision, the term ‘serious attempt’ implies that in such a case, the country wanting 
to adopt the measure must offer technical or financial assistance. According to the 
AB, the US failed to take into account administrative and financial costs of imple-
menting the regulatory program required by the US.
243
 The US discriminated against 





c) Migratory resources in particular 
The AB pointed out that in case of highly migratory species in particular, interna-
tional cooperation by all countries through which the species migrated was demand-
ed.
245
 Thus, there is a special requirement in terms of migratory resources that each 
country through which the species migrate must participate in the negotiations and 





d) Intensity of negotiations 
What must not be neglected is the fact that the length of negotiations and the level of 
compromise offered by the country that wants to adopt a measure varies depending 
on how urgent a protective measure is.
247
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It is logically consistent that in case of an endangered species negotiations can be 
shorter and less liberal than in case of a resource that is not threatened with extinc-
tion. If a negotiated compromise cannot be reached within a reasonable time, a pro-
tective measure can be adopted unilaterally. This view is supported by Principle 12 
of the Rio Declaration stating that countries ‘should’ cooperate and ‘should’ avoid 
unilateral action but it does not generally prohibit unilateral action where internation-
al consensus cannot be reached. 
 
e) Conclusion 
As a result, a state that wants to adopt an environmental protection measure must en-
ter into more or less extensive negotiations offering actual sacrifices and compromis-
es. The negotiations must usually include all countries affected by the measure in a 
non-discriminating way. Particularly in terms of migratory species, the country want-
ing to implement a protective measure must involve all other countries concerned, 
i.e. the countries through which the species migrate.  
The criteria outlined above must be considered when determining if entering into 
an international agreement was seriously attempted. In the end, it needs to be as-




3. MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS AS A MEANS TO INTERPRET ARTICLE XX OF THE 
GATT 
Another crucial point of the Shrimp-Turtle decision that has to be examined is the 
AB’s use of multilateral agreements other than the GATT to interpret Article XX (g) 
of the GATT. In particular, the AB employed the CITES in order to assess whether 
the resource at stake was ‘exhaustible’ within the meaning of paragraph g of Arti-
cle XX of the GATT.
249
 Also, it referred to the Rio Declaration in order to examine 
whether the measure at issue was applied in a way that posed an unjustifiable dis-
crimination under the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT.
250
 
The use of multilateral agreements other than the GATT as a means to interpret 
the GATT entails that the interpretation of provisions such as Article XX of the 
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GATT can vary depending on the different agreements the parties to the dispute have 
entered into. Thus, it needs to be examined whether the AB’s approach was legally 
permissible and suitable. 
 
a) The legality of the use of multilateral agreements to interpret the 
GATT 
It first needs to be assessed whether it is legally permissible to interpret the GATT by 
means of multilateral agreements outside of the GATT.  
Using agreements between the parties other than the treaty at issue for interpreta-
tive means is a general rule of international law laid down in Article 31 (3) (c) of the 
VCLT. According to this provision, a treaty (here: the GATT) shall be interpreted 
taking into account any relevant rules of internal law applicable in the relations be-
tween the parties. The multilateral agreements referred to by the AB, particularly the 
CITES and the Rio Declaration, are such rules of international law. 
Also Article 3.2 of the DSU that deals with the purpose and competence of the 
WTO dispute settlement body only prohibits the adding to or diminishing of rights 
and obligations under the WTO agreements but allows for the interpretation pursuant 
to public international law. 
Thus, there is no legal obstacle to employing multilateral agreements other than 
the GATT to interpret Article XX (g) of the GATT. 
 
b) Other considerations 
Critics of the AB’s approach contend that it is not desirable that WTO Members can 
influence the way the WTO Agreements are interpreted by entering into multilateral 
agreements with other Members.
251
 If the WTO adjudicating body uses a multilateral 
agreement between the parties to a dispute to interpret the GATT, the outcome can 
differ from another dispute the parties to which had not entered into a multilateral 
agreement or had entered into a different one. 
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However, the WTO Agreements are treaties that interact with other provisions of 
international law.
252
 In international law, there is a general interrelation between a 
treaty and other international rules. The treaty must be assessed in the context of the-
se other rules, particularly other treaties being applicable between the parties of the 
dispute, as made clear by Article 31 (3) (c) VCLT.
253
 
Also, what must not be neglected is that the WTO is an international organisation 
consisting of its various Members and is based on regulatory diversity.
254
 It guaran-
tees the rights of its Members by means of the most-favoured-nation treatment,
255
 an 
instrument that only exist because different Members have different rules. Unlike the 
law of the European Union, WTO law does not constitute a uniform legal order 
where the same rules equally apply to all Members.
256
 
Thus, a uniform interpretation of the GATT is not mandatory and differences in 
the application of WTO law are accepted as long as these differences do not lead to a 
discrimination of Members. 
 
c) Conclusion 
As a result, it is legally permissible and appropriate when the WTO adjudicating 
body employs multilateral agreements outside of the GATT to interpret Article XX 
of the GATT. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Shrimp-Turtle decision contains some areas of uncertainty that 
need to be clarified by the WTO adjudicating body but also new requirements and 
guidelines that future decisions can draw on. The AB tried to interpret and narrow 
down ambiguous criteria of Article XX (g) of the GATT, namely the terms ‘exhaust-
ible natural resource’ and ‘unjustifiable discrimination’. However, in some points it 
failed to elaborate on its interpretation and establishment of new requirements. Nev-
ertheless, subsequent decisions of the WTO adjudicating body can draw on the 
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Shrimp-Turtle decision and further develop and improve the criteria set out therein in 














V. THE ISSUE OF UNILATERAL MEASURES WITH EXTRATERRITO-
RIAL EFFECT AND THE BALANCING OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 
It is said that the Shrimp-Turtle decision, in contrast to the Tuna-Dolphin panel re-
ports, recognised the legality of extraterritorial measures to protect the environment 
under Article XX (g) of the GATT.
257
 However, the legality of such measures has to 
be examined not only by interpreting WTO jurisprudence but also against the back-
drop of general rules of treaty interpretation, particularly principles of general inter-
national law: Since the wording of Article XX (g) of the GATT does not determine 
whether the provision covers extraterritorial measures,
258
 other means of interpreta-
tion must be taken into account. As pointed out by Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT, 
one must look at the context of the treaty including applicable rules of international 
law.
259
 Among these rules of international law are customary international law and 
general principles of law such as the principles of state sovereignty, non-intervention 
and the balancing of rights.
260
 These principles need to be analysed in order to assess 
the legality of unilateral measures with extraterritorial effect in the present context. 
 
1. THE NOTION OF UNILATERAL AND EXTRATERRITORIAL MEASURES 
In order to examine the question in how far unilateral measures with extraterritorial 
effect can be consistent with Article XX of the GATT against the backdrop of prin-
ciples of international law, it first needs to be determined what the terms ‘unilateral’ 
and ‘extraterritorial’ mean. 
 
a) Unilateral measures 
Deduced from common parlance, a measure that a country implements unilaterally is 
an individual action by a state regarding its foreign affairs without or with only min-
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imal involvement of other states.
261
 ‘Unilateral’ contrasts with the terms ‘multilat-
eral’ or ‘cooperative’. A unilateral measure expresses the will of only one state.
262
 
In the present context, the unilateral measure is a legislative act.
263
 For example, 
a country that wants to promote environmental protection imposes trade sanctions on 
other countries in order to enforce its environmental legislation. In the Shrimp-Turtle 
case, the measure that the US implemented to promote the protection of sea turtles 
was Section 609 which was a legislative act.  
Hence, a unilateral measure is the unilateral enactment of norms in the trade-





b) Extraterritorial measures 
A unilateral measure can have extraterritorial effect, even if it is a trade measure.
264
 
A measure has extraterritorial effect if it applies to conduct on foreign territo-
ry.
265
 In other words, an extraterritorial measure regulates an action occurring outside 
of the territory of the country implementing the measure.
266
  
Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
267
is 
an example of a trade measure with extraterritorial effect. The provision prohibits 
certain actions conducted on foreign territory. It imposes legal consequences on un-
dertakings acting in an anti-competitive way no matter if the undertaking at issue en-
ters the territory of the country enforcing the measure.
268
 
Critics argue that trade measures are in any case domestic or territorial since they 
are applied within the territory or at least at the border of the country implementing 
the measure.
269
 In contrast to that, at least trade measures that regulate the way in 
which a product is produced and processed (non-product-related measures) must be 
deemed extraterritorial. Since, in case of non-product-related measures the produc-
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tion and processing takes place outside of the regulating country’s territory, these 
measures have extraterritorial effect.
270
 The measures at stake regulate conduct oc-
curring abroad.  
In the Tuna-Dolphin and Shrimp-Turtle disputes, the US imposed an import ban 
of tuna/shrimp because of the way in which it was harvested outside of the territory 
of the US. Thus, according to the panels/AB, these measures had extraterritorial ef-
fects.
271
 Admittedly, even among those authors who recognise the extraterritorial ef-
fect of non-product related trade measures, critics contend that it is not sufficient for 
a measure to be extraterritorial that it only has indirect effects on foreign countries. 
According to this opinion, a measure that only prohibits the importation of certain 
products due to the way they got produced or processed abroad does not directly ap-
ply to foreign conduct and can, thus, not be deemed extraterritorial.
272
 What must not 
be neglected, however, is the fact that the GATT/WTO jurisprudence has supposed 
that also import bans can have extraterritorial effect if they are non-product-related 
measures.
273
 In the Tuna-Dolphin disputes, this perception became clear when the 
panel addressed the personal principle as well as other principles of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction.
274
 Accordingly, the AB in Shrimp-Turtle stated that the sea turtles at 
stake did not fall under the exclusive ownership of the US but that there was a suffi-
cient nexus between the sea turtles and the US.
275
 It can be inferred from the suffi-
cient nexus requirement that the AB regarded the measure at stake as extraterritori-
al.
276
 Hence, the measures at issue in Tuna-Dolphin and Shrimp-Turtle are deemed 
extraterritorial for the further examination of the legality of unilateral measures with 
extraterritorial effect to protect the environment. Apart from this, the following dis-
cussion of the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention is useful and nec-
essary in terms of non-product-related measures other than import bans that have di-
rect legal implications on foreign countries. 
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c) Measures pursuing territorial or extraterritorial concerns 
A unilateral measure regulating conduct occurring abroad can serve domestic as well 
as extraterritorial concerns. 
The measure at issue in Shrimp-Turtle, for example, applied to conduct occurring 
on foreign territory, namely the harvesting of shrimp by exporting countries in waters 
within their jurisdiction, and promoted an extraterritorial concern, which was the pro-
tection of endangered sea turtles.
277
 In the Tuna-Dolphin dispute, on the other hand, 
the legal provision at stake regulated domestic and foreign conduct (the fishing of 
tuna in and outside of waters over which the US had jurisdiction) to pursue extrater-
ritorial concerns, namely to protect dolphins in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean.
278
 
A third example is Article 101 TFEU which applies to anti-competitive agreements 




When assessing the legality of measures in the trade-environment context, one 
has to take into account whether the measure at issue regulates domestic or extraterri-
torial conduct and whether it promotes domestic or extraterritorial concerns. In gen-
eral, a trade restricting measure is easier to justify if it regulates an action taking 
place on foreign territory but is based on consensus of the other states concerned. Al-
so, the fact that a measure regulating conduct abroad was implemented to protect 
domestic concerns is a relevant factor for assessing the justifiability of the meas-
ure.
280
 Article 101 TFEU, for example, has extraterritorial effect.
281
 However, the 
provision’s extraterritorial effect is justified on the basis that extraterritorial measures 
by foreign actors have negative domestic economic impacts. Thus, the provision pur-
sues legitimate domestic interests. 
For purposes of the current analysis, an extraterritorial measure includes not only 
measures with legal effects on foreign countries but also measures that deal with ex-
traterritorially located concerns. 
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2. THE LEGALITY OF UNILATERAL MEASURES WITH EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT 
AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF THE PRINCIPLES OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND NON-
INTERVENTION 
The question remains whether general principles of international law allow for the 
justification of unilateral measures with extraterritorial effects where those measures 
promote extraterritorial interests, namely the conservation of resources situated out-
side of the territory of the country implementing the measure. 
 
a) State sovereignty 
The first general principle of international law that needs to be discussed is the prin-
ciple of state sovereignty since extraterritorial measures affect foreign sovereign 
states. State sovereignty relates to the equality of states,
282
 and the competences and 
jurisdictions amongst states.
283
 It includes the right of a state to set down its own po-
litical and economic system, and foreign policies.
284
 In other words, sovereignty in-
volves the right to self-determination comprising a state’s internal and external com-
petence. 
It has to be noted that in the absence of a transfer of sovereign rights to the inter-
national level, WTO Members generally remain free to unilaterally regulate their 
own markets, provided that they respect the relevant GATT rules.
285
 The AB in its 
Shrimp-Turtle decision recognised this and even went one step further by stating that 
a country’s domestic measure is not necessarily unjustifiable under Article XX of the 
GATT just because it forces other countries to comply with its policies.
286
 According 
to the AB, the WTO Members had recognised the domestic policies behind the 
measures referred to in the individual paragraphs of Article XX of the GATT as im-
portant and legitimate by explicitly including them in one of the paragraphs. 
When a country implements extraterritorial measures, the sovereign rights of that 
country often conflict with the sovereign rights of other states affected by the meas-
ure: The country implementing the extraterritorial measure exercises its state compe-
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tence which includes the right to self-determination by implementing domestic 
laws.
287
 Generally, due to the sovereignty principle, other states must not interfere 
with the sovereign state act by the country implementing the measure. However, oth-
er states affected by the extraterritorial measure can, in turn, make use of their state 
competences and their right to self-determination. These states also have the right to 
set down their own polices and to implement their own rules in accordance with the 
sovereignty principle. Thus, the sovereign right of the country implementing the ex-
traterritorial measure is constraint by conflicting sovereign rights of the other states. 
As this conflict shows, state sovereignty and the right to self-determination can-
not be absolute. Instead, the contradictory rights of various countries need to be rec-
onciled. A general principle of law which is used to solve this issue is the principle of 
the balancing of rights. The sovereign rights of all countries concerned must be bal-
anced.
288
 The balancing of rights, to which also the AB in Shrimp-Turtle referred, 





A principle that is closely connected to sovereignty is the principle of non-
intervention. As a counterpart of sovereignty, it poses a barrier to extraterritorial 
measures.
290
 Intervention by a foreign country is prohibited if it restricts another 
country’s right to determine its own political and economic system, and foreign poli-
cies, and if it forces certain policies on that other country.
291
 Thereby, the principle of 
non-intervention shields a country from jurisdictional interferences by foreign coun-
tries. 
Against this backdrop, it appears to be unlawful to adopt a domestic measure 
with extraterritorial effect in order to make other countries change their policies 
where these other countries want to get access to the regulating country’s market, as 
was the case in Tuna-Dolphin and Shrimp-Turtle. If a country implements a certain 
measure and thereby forces other countries to change their policies, the implement-
ing country restricts the other countries’ rights to determine their own policies. If the 
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other countries still want to access the implementing country’s market, they cannot 
enforce their own polices but have to follow the implementing country’s rules. This 
appears to be an intervention by the implementing country. On the other hand, what 
must not be neglected is that the right to implement domestic measures, even where 
those measure have extraterritorial effect, is included in the sovereignty principle. It 
is a sovereign right of each state to set down its own foreign policies. As this conflict 
shows, it needs to be assessed when an extraterritorial measure falls under a state’s 
right to sovereignty and when the principle of non-intervention is violated. 
What becomes clear is that, as with sovereignty, the principle of non-intervention 
cannot be absolute. When a country makes permissible use of its sovereign rights and 
when it crosses the line to prohibited intervention must be analysed on a case-by-case 
basis taking into account conflicting rights of other states concerned.
292
 The scope of 
the non-intervention principle is dependent on the protected interests at issue.
293
 Un-
der Article XX (g) of the GATT, the protected interest of the country implementing 
the extraterritorial measure is the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. This 
is a goal that the WTO Members explicitly recognised as important by including it in 
Article XX of the GATT as an exception to their obligations under other GATT pro-
visions. Moreover, the reference to sustainable development in the preamble of the 
Marrakesh Agreement shows that environmental protection plays a significant role 
within the WTO.
294
 On the other hand, the sovereign rights of the country adopting 
the environmental protection measure are restricted to some extent because of the 
commitments it has made under the WTO Agreements including the GATT. Alt-
hough the WTO Members did not transfer their sovereign rights to an international 
institution, they agreed on certain obligations limiting their external competence and 
their right to self-determination by concluding an international treaty.
295
 
In the end, it remains necessary to reconcile the conflicting rights of the countries 
involved. In the present context, the right to sovereignty in terms of implementing a 
certain environmental protection measure conflicts with the right to invoke the prin-
ciple of non-intervention of countries whose access to the implementing country’s 
market is subject to a change of environmental policies. 
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The principles of sovereignty and non-intervention are general principles of interna-
tional law which must be observed when a country implements an extraterritorial 
measure. However, these principles are not absolute. Instead, their scope is vague 
and needs to be interpreted and assessed on a case-by-case basis considering the con-
flict of states’ rights inherent in extraterritorial measures that are adopted unilateral-
ly. 
As a result, the analysis of sovereignty and non-intervention amounts to a neces-
sity to balance the conflicting rights of the states concerned. In the following para-
graph it will be described how this balancing of rights works. 
 
3. THE BALANCING OF RIGHTS 
When measures with extraterritorial effects on foreign countries are implemented 
unilaterally, the conflicting rights of the states concerned need to be balanced so that 
the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention are reconciled.
296
 In terms of 
the trade-environment conflict within the WTO, that means that the right of a country 
to invoke an exception under Article XX (g) of the GATT must be balanced with the 
substantive rights of other countries under the GATT.
297
 It needs to be analysed what 
‘balancing of rights’ means and how it should be conducted. 
 
a) The notion of balancing of rights 
The balancing of rights is a mandatory requirement for extraterritorial measures in 
international law.
298
 It is said to be a general principle of law resulting from the non-
intervention principle.
299
 A measure is inconsistent with the principle of non-
intervention where the sovereign right of a state to determine its own policies is vio-
lated by an act of another sovereign state.
300
 The conflicting rights need to be brought 
in accordance with each other. Since each country generally has the right to deter-
mine and enforce its own policies without interference by other countries, the rights 
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of all states concerned have to be considered and no state must be deprived of its 
right to set down its own policies.  
The balancing of competing rights is usually conducted by an international 
court.
301
 Particularly in terms of international environmental law, international courts 




In the Shrimp-Turtle decision, the AB balanced the right of a Member to invoke 
an exception under Article XX of the GATT on the one hand and the substantive 
rights of the other Members under the GATT on the other hand.
303
 It drew ‘a line of 
equilibrium’
304
 between the right of one Member State to implement a measure to 
conserve exhaustible natural resources and the rights of the other Member States un-
der the GATT. The AB made clear that neither the right of the regulating country to 
invoke an exception under Article XX (g) of the GATT nor the rights of the export-
ing countries relying on the trade related commitments made by the regulating coun-
try must be nullified.
305
 According to the AB, if a Member abused its right to invoke 
an exception, it would reduce its obligations under the GATT denying their mandato-
ry nature. Thereby, the regulating state negated the rights of the other WTO Mem-
bers under the GATT which posed a violation of the GATT.
306
  
Often, the principle of proportionality is used to guide and structure the bal-
ancing of rights.
307
 The proportionality principle is a means of interpretation which 
helps determining vague legal concepts like the concept of balancing of rights.
 308
 It 
serves as a guideline to balance conflicting interests in various national and interna-
tional legal orders.
309
 The balancing of rights is a complex concept which involves 
considering various rights of many different countries. Courts must give themselves 
certain guidelines on how approach the balancing process to make sure that they con-
sider all rights equitably. If the balancing process is broken down into certain steps 
that are steady in any case, jurisprudence gains consistency which leads to more legal 
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 This can be achieved by the use of the proportionality principle to struc-
ture the balancing process. A court does not merely compare the conflicting rights at 
issue but rather follows a certain line of argument to reconcile conflicting rights. All 
arguments must fit under the structure of the proportionality test. Thereby, countries 
can better assess the legality of a measure before implementing it.  
In order to see how the structuring of the balancing process by means of the 
proportionality principle works, it needs to be analysed what ‘proportionality’ means, 
how the proportionality principle is applied, and whether this principle has been rec-
ognised by the WTO adjudicating body under Article XX of the GATT.  
 
b) The notion of proportionality 
There is no single overarching principle of proportionality, neither under WTO law 
nor in general international law.
311
 It can be applied and interpreted in different ways 
taking into account the distinctive features of each legal system.
312
 If one wants to 
use the proportionality principle as a means to structure the balancing of rights in the 
present context, it needs to be made clear how the proportionality test should be un-
derstood and approached in terms of Article XX of the GATT.  
In the context of the balancing of rights under the chapeau of Article XX of the 
GATT, the goal pursued by a certain measure must be compared with the disad-
vantages caused by that measure.
313
 There has to be a causal connection between the 
measure and the goal. This is shown by the Shrimp-Turtle decision where the AB 
stated that the measure at stake had to be implemented to conserve exhaustible natu-
ral resources.
314
 Secondly, as outlined by the AB, the measure chosen must not be the 
heaviest one if other alternatives are reasonably available.
315
 Rather, the measure 
must be the least restrictive one.
316
 Thirdly, the disadvantage caused must not be dis-
proportionate to the advantages the measure aims at.
317
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These three components of the balancing process by the AB (causal connection, 
least restrictions and no disproportionality) show distinct similarities to the three-step 
proportionality test as it is known under the law of the European Union. Under Euro-
pean law, the balancing process is structured by means of an assessment of a meas-
ure’s proportionality. The European proportionality test is based on the three criteria 
of suitability, necessity and proportionality in the narrow sense.
 318
 Only if the meas-
ure fulfils all three criteria, it can be deemed proportionate. It will be explained in the 
following what these three criteria mean in order to analyse if the European three-
step approach can be transferred to Article XX of the GATT: 
Under the three-step approach, first, the country implementing the measure at 
stake needs to pursue a legitimate goal and the measure must be suitable to promote 
this goal (suitability).
319
 For example, environmental protection is a legitimate goal; 
the measure at issue has to further environmental protection in some way. The suita-
bility requirement is not fulfilled where a measure cannot further the goal at all or 
has a mere protectionist purpose.
320
 The threshold of this requirement is rather low 
since this first step constitutes a coarse filter only.
321
 That means most measures will 
pass the suitability test but they can still violate the proportionality principle in case 
they are not necessary or disproportionate. 
Secondly, from all measures reasonably available, the chosen measure has to be 
the least restrictive one (necessity).
322
 In other words, the measure must not violate 
the competing rights more than necessary but has to be the mildest means. In order to 
examine the necessity requirement, one has to look for alternative measures, first. If 
alternative measures are available, one has to assess whether these alternatives are 
equally effective in pursuing the goal, afterwards.
323
 If a less restrictive measure is 
available and equally effective, the chosen measure is not necessary, and thus, in vio-
lation of the proportionality principle. In the present context, that means that a coun-
try has to adopt the least trade restrictive measure to promote environmental protec-
tion policies. 
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Lastly, the negative, i.e. trade-restricting, effects must not be disproportionate to 
the goal pursued. The requirement is referred to as proportionality in the narrow 
sense.
324
 The issue of proportionality in the narrow sense is only relevant where the 
measure at stake has been found to be suitable and necessary. It is this last step where 
the actual weighing and balancing of rights comes into play.
 325
 The assessment of 
proportionality in the narrow sense requires a comprehensive reasoning considering 
all relevant facts and circumstances of the case at issue.
326
 One must particularly look 
at the objectives of the country implementing the measure and the intensity of the 
restriction of the conflicting rights. Only where a thorough assessment leads to the 
result that the measure at stake is not disproportionate in relation to the goal pursued, 
the proportionality-in-the-narrow-sense requirement is fulfilled. 
Thus, under European law a measure is consistent with the proportionality 
principle if it is suitable, necessary and proportionate in the narrow sense in relation 
to the goal its pursues. 
 
c) The proportionality principle under Article XX of the GATT 
The question remains whether the proportionality principle with the three-step ap-
proach can be transferred to Article XX of the GATT and whether the WTO adjudi-
cating body has recognised the principle as a guideline for the balancing of rights. 
 
(i) First, it must be noted that no WTO decision dealing with extraterritorial 
measures in the trade-environment conflict has ever expressly referred to the princi-
ple of proportionality. Thus, the principle is not explicitly recognised under Arti-
cle XX (g) of the GATT. However, it could have been implicitly referred to by the 
WTO adjudicating body. 
In Shrimp-Turtle, in the context of the balancing of rights, the AB used the terms 
‘good faith’, ‘abus de droit’ (abuse of rights), and ‘reasonableness’ as an ‘interpreta-
tive guidance’ for the balancing of rights.
 327
 These terms can all be deemed refer-
ences to the proportionality principle since there is no consistent terminology with 
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regard to this principle.
328
 Particularly, the term ‘reasonableness’ is often used as a 
synonym for ‘proportionality’ and the abuse of rights doctrine is sometimes under-
stood as being related to the proportionality principle.
329
 Thus, it needs to be exam-
ined if the AB intended to refer to the principle of proportionality since that would 
mean that the AB has recognised the proportionality principle as a guiding principle 
for the balancing of rights under the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT. 
According to Shrimp-Turtle, the principle of good faith was a general principle of 
international law and governed the exercise of rights by countries in general. The 
abuse of rights doctrine, on the other hand, proscribed the abusive exercise of coun-
tries’ rights, for example the abusive exercise of exceptions provided for in Arti-
cle XX (a) to (j) of the GATT.
330
 The AB referred to ‘reasonableness’ stating that the 
abuse of rights doctrine made sure that rights were invoked in a reasonable way 
where these rights interfered with other rights included in a treaty.
331
 If a Member 
exercised its right to invoke an exception in a way that negated the substantive rights 
of other Members, that would lead to a breach of the GATT.
332
  
Following these remarks, the doctrine of abuse of rights could be understood in a 
way that relates to the proportionality principle as an instrument to guide the balanc-
ing of conflicting rights
333
. Both principles have the function to prevent the abusive 
exercise of one right that rules out a conflicting right. On the other hand, there is a 
strong position within legal literature that denies that the AB referred to the propor-
tionality principle in this passage of the Shrimp-Turtle decision. According to these 
authors, the AB intended to interpret the words ‘arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimi-
nation’ independently in connection with the notion of abuse of rights instead of re-
ferring to the notion of proportionality.
334
 The abuse of rights doctrine was ‘more 
limited’ than the proportionality principle and did merely require a comparison of the 
conflicting rights in the respective case instead of establishing a hierarchy.
335
 Moreo-
ver, the AB had never outlawed a measure because of its negative effects on interna-
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tional trade although it had found the measure to be legitimate and necessary. 
336
 Al-




Hence, the AB’s remarks on the principles of good faith, abuse of rights, and 
reasonableness cannot be read as an implicit acknowledgement of the proportionality 
principle. Thus, the principle of proportionality has not been recognised as an in-





(ii) Nevertheless, the application of the three-step approach to the proportionality 
principle is a useful means for the WTO adjudicating body to structure the balancing 
of rights under the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT. It makes perfect sense to 
transfer the European approach to Article XX of the GATT as will be shown by a 




The three-step approach that is recognised under European law is particularly ap-
plied under Article 36 of the TFEU. If a European Court has to determine whether a 
measure fulfils the requirements of this provision, it examines whether the measure 
at stake is suitable, necessary and proportionate in the narrow sense.
340
 Article 36 of 
the TFEU justifies trade restrictions that violate Articles 34 and 35 of TFEU. Ac-
cording to Articles 34 and 35 of TFEU, quantitative restrictions on imports and ex-
ports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member 
States of the European Union. Article 36 of the TFEU states that  
‘[t]he provisions of Articles 34 and 35 shall not preclude prohibitions or re-
strictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public moral-
ity, public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, ani-
mals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or ar-
chaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property. Such 
prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary dis-
crimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.’ 
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The nature and text of the provision are very close to Article XX of the GATT.
341
 
Article XX justifies quantitative restrictions in violation of Article XI of the GATT 
on grounds of, inter alia, the protection of animal or plant life or health, and the con-
servation of exhaustible natural resources.
342
 Article 36 of the TFEU justifies such 
restrictions on grounds of the protection of health and life of animals or plants. Thus, 
the protective purpose of both provisions overlaps. Moreover, both provisions only 
allow for justification provided that the measure at issue does not constitute a means 
of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member 
States. At this point, the wording of Article XX of the GATT and Article 36 of the 
TFEU is almost identical. The clause prohibiting an arbitrary discrimination or dis-
guised restriction guarantees that the exceptions provided for in the individual para-
graphs in Article XX of the GATT and sentence 1 of Article 36 of the TFEU respec-
tively are not abused.
343
 
Also the jurisprudence based on the two provisions of the GATT and the TFEU 
is similar. The European Court of Justice held in its Stoke-on-Trent decision
344
 that 
the assessment of a justification under Article 36 TFEU
345
 requires the weighing of 
the implementing country’s interest in pursuing the legitimate goal against the inter-
est of the other Member States to ensure the free movement of goods.
346
 Similarly, 
the AB in Shrimp-Turtle found that the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT requires 
a balancing of rights between the rights of a Member to invoke an exception and the 
substantive rights of the other Members under the GATT.
347
 One of these substantive 
rights is the right to free trade following from the prohibition of quantitative re-
strictions in Article XI of the GATT. 
According to this comparison, Article XX of the GATT shows distinct affinities 
to Article 36 of the TFEU. The proportionality principle with its three steps is recog-
nised in terms of Article 36 of the TFEU as a means to balance conflicting rights, 
inter alia, in the trade-environment conflict. Due to the similarities of the provisions, 
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it also is a useful and appropriate means to structure the balancing of rights under the 
chapeau of Article XX of the GATT. 
 
(iii) Moreover, although WTO jurisprudence does not explicitly or implicitly rec-
ognise the proportionality principle in terms of the balancing of rights under Arti-
cle XX of the GATT, the AB’s way of balancing conflicting rights resembles a pro-
portionality analysis.
348
 The Shrimp-Turtle decision shows similarities to the three-
step approach to some extent: 
In in the context of the balancing of conflicting rights, the AB found that the pro-
tection of a transnational natural resource requires international cooperation before 
implementing a measure unilaterally.
349
 This finding can be interpreted to the effect 
that a unilateral measure that deals with not only domestic but also extraterritorial 
environmental concerns is – without prior negotiations – n t even suitable to pro-
mote a transnational policy goal.
350
 As stated above, a measure is not suitable if it has 
a merely protectionist purpose.
351
 The unilateral measure at stake in Shrimp-Turtle 
had a protectionist purpose since, instead of seeking a negotiated compromise, the 
US used an import ban to promote its policies. Thus, the previous remarks of the AB 
match the suitability-step. 
The AB continued its balancing process stating that an alternative course of ac-
tion was open to the US and that this alternative would have been less trade-
restrictive. It held that the measure applied in the Shrimp-Turtle dispute was ‘the 
heaviest “weapon”’ and that other measures to promote the policy goal would have 
been reasonably available.
352
 Therefore, the AB deemed the measure inconsistent 
with the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT. This reasoning resembles the necessi-
ty-step of the three-step approach to the proportionality principle.
353
 The AB pointed 
out available alternative measures and found that these alternatives could equally 
support the policy goal without being the heaviest weapon. 
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Proceeding with the analysis of the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT, the AB 
held that the measure at issue was applied without previous inquiries as to whether it 
was appropriate for other countries considering the varying conditions prevailing in 
various exporting countries.
354
 Also, the AB found that the measure was applied in a 
way that was barely or not at all flexible.
355
 These findings fit under both the suitabil-
ity and necessity requirement of the proportionality principle:
 356
 The application of 
the measure was not suitable to promote extraterritorial environmental concerns 
since it did not take into account varying conditions in foreign countries. If the vary-
ing conditions had been considered, and if the measures had been applied in a more 
flexible way, the alternative application would have been less trade-restrictive. 
The AB stated that the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT involved the balanc-
ing of the right of a Member to invoke an exception and the substantive rights of oth-
er Members under the GATT, and that a legitimate policy goal could justify a trade-
restricting measure as long as the application of that measure did not distort and nul-
lify the balance of rights.
357
 The idea of balancing conflicting rights by looking at the 
means and ends and considering the objective of the measure and the intensity of the 
restrictions caused resembles the third-step of the proportionality principle.
358
 Also, 
the AB pointed out the importance of taking into account the particular circumstanc-
es of each specific case which is in line with the proportionality-in-the-narrow-sense 
requirement as outlined above. 
These remarks show that the AB’s application of Article XX of the GATT focus-





(iv) In addition to that, there are no legal obstacles in the law of the WTO to ap-
plying Article XX of the GATT in a way that includes the proportionality principle.  
According to Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU, the WTO DSB cannot add to or 
diminish the rights and obligations provided in the WTO Agreements. These provi-
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sions prohibit judicial activism that changes the substance of the rights and obliga-
tions of the WTO Members under the GATT.
360
 However, the WTO adjudicating 
body can clarify the provisions contained in the GATT and interpret them pursuant to 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law.
361
 As outlined above, 
the balancing of rights is used to interpret the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT. 
The three-step proportionately test, in turn, is a means to structure the balancing pro-
cess. It thereby serves interpretative purposes.
362
 As a result, the proportionality prin-
ciple is a means to clarify and interpreted Article XX of the GATT since it is applied 
in connection with the balancing of rights to determine the legality of measures und 
the chapeau of Article XX.
363
 
Thus, the application of the proportionality principle under the chapeau of Arti-
cle XX of the GATT is a legitimate instrument and in accordance with the DSU.  
 
d) Conclusion 
The assessment of the legality of an extraterritorial measure as an exception under 
Article XX of the GATT requires the balancing of the right of the Member invoking 
the exception and the substantive rights of other Members concerned under the 
GATT. 
What helps to structure the balancing of rights is the use of the proportionality 
principle. Although WTO jurisprudence has not recognised the principle yet, the Eu-
ropean three-step approach to the proportionality principle can be transferred to the 
chapeau of Article XX of the GATT. Article XX of the GATT is similar to Article 36 
of the TFEU where European courts apply the three-step approach. The AB’s way of 
balancing conflicting rights under the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT shows 
distinct similarities to this approach, and as an instrument of interpretation the pro-
portionality principle is consistent with the law of the WTO.  
WTO jurisprudence has already clarified the GATT to some extent and made its 
application more consistent. In order to achieve further improvements, the panels and 
AB must impose certain guidelines for themselves. The proportionality principle is a 
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suitable instrument to reach more consistency and legal certainty and, at the same 
time, offers enough space and discretion for the adjudicating body to assess each in-
dividual dispute on a case-by-case basis. 
Thus, the WTO adjudicating body should recognise the proportionality principle 
with its three-steps as a means to structure the balancing of rights under the chapeau 














VI. THE ISSUE OF UNILATERISM AND THE PRINCIPLE OF 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
Another principle of general international law that needs to be analysed in order to 
assess the legality of unilateral measures with extraterritorial effect in the trade-
environment context is the principle of international cooperation. It has to be exam-
ined what the principle of international cooperation means and what implications it 
has on unilateral measures with extraterritorial effect. 
 
1. THE PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
The principle of international cooperation is a general principle of international law. 
According to this principle, no country can unilaterally impose its policies on other 
countries without these countries’ consent.
364
  
The principle of international cooperation includes the obligation to negotiate.
365
 
Negotiation is a part of cooperation. Both negotiation and cooperation are obligations 
of conduct. That means, a country must seek to come to a negotiated compromise 
with other states concerned but the countries do not necessarily have to reach a con-
clusion if a conclusion is not reasonable available.
366
 Also the AB in Shrimp-Turtle 
referred to this principle in connection with its serious-attempt requirement.
367
 
The question remains if the principle of international cooperation always outlaws 
unilateral measures that have been implemented without prior negotiation and coop-
eration efforts or whether there are situations in which prior negotiation and coopera-
tion are dispensable. In order to answer this question, two provisions incorporating 
the principle of international cooperation will be analysed below. 
 
2. THE GENERAL OBLIGATION TO COOPERATE UNDER ARTICLE 1 OF THE 
UN CHARTER 
The first provision that needs to be examined in order to analyse the principle of in-
ternational cooperation is Article 1 of the UN Charter. This provision includes the 
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general obligation to cooperate.
368
 It is a rule of general international law that lays 
down customary rules.
369
 Thus, the rule is applicable to disputes regarding Arti-
cle XX of the GATT since WTO law is no self-contained legal order but interrelates 
with general international law.
370
 
According to Article 1 of the UN Charter, one of the purposes of the UN is to 
safeguard peace.
371
 This safeguarding of peace is facilitated through the development 
of friendly relations among states.
372
 Friendly relations, in turn, are particularly es-
tablished through international cooperation.
373
 The provision contains the obligation 
of countries, which want to promote transnational interests, to seek for negotiated 
solutions, at least where cooperation and negotiation is reasonably open to them, par-
ticularly through international institutions and treaties.
374
 Whether or not cooperation 




The AB in Shrimp-Turtle followed this argument stating that a serious effort to 
negotiate was required in the present case since negotiation structures were reasona-
bly available due to the Inter-American Convention.
376
 According to the AB, the 
need of cooperative efforts was recognised by the WTO itself and various interna-
tional instruments and declarations.
377
 
In terms of transnational environmental concerns, cooperation and negotiation 
structures will usually be reasonably available due to a variety of international organ-
isations and treaties being applicable in the trade-environment context. For example, 
if a certain species of animal, which is located not only on the territory of the country 
which wants to implement a measure but also in other countries, is threatened with 
extinction, action is required urgently. It would be unreasonable to require the coun-
try to enter into time-consuming negotiations before adopting a protective measure 
unilaterally. However, the regulating country would at least be required to negotiate 
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within the international forums dealing with environmental concerns to which he has 
already been a Member. Within existing forums, negotiations are generally less time-
consuming since they have been established particularly for international negotia-
tions. Therefore, international forums dealing with environmental concerns to which 
the implementing country has already been a Member offer an alternative reasonably 
available even where an environmental protection measure is urgently required.  
Thus, Article 1 of the UN Charter contains the general principle that international 
cooperation and negotiation is usually required in terms of promoting transnational 
environmental concerns. This makes the unilateral implementation of extraterritorial 




3. THE COOPERATION PRINCIPLE UNDER PRINCIPLE 12 OF THE RIO DECLARATION 
The second provision that has to be analysed to answer the question whether interna-
tional cooperation is a mandatory requirement in the present context is Principle 12 
of the Rio Declaration. First, the nature of the provision must be clarified, before dis-
cussing its content and consequences for unilateral measures promoting international 
environmental concerns. 
 
a) The nature of Principle 12 
The Rio Declaration is an instrument expressing international consensus regarding 
environmental issues but does not contain any legally binding rules.
379
 The declara-
tion is qualified as soft law. Consequently, Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration does, 
in general, not impose binding obligations on countries, either.  
However, Principle 12 obtained legally binding effects in the context of the 
Shrimp-Turtle decision. Interpreting the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT, the AB 
balanced, inter alia, the right of an individual state to invoke exceptions under Arti-
cle XX with the rights of all other states concerned to be involved in international 
cooperation efforts.
380
 The AB stated that the need for international cooperation had 
been recognised by the WTO and other international instruments such as the Rio 
Declaration.
381
 According to the AB, Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration was of par-
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ticular relevance since it pointed out the need to seek for international consensus re-
garding transboundary or global environmental problems. For the US had violated 
the cooperation requirement, the AB found an unjustifiable discrimination.
382
 Thus, 
the AB used Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration to find a violation of the chapeau of 
Article XX of the GATT. Thereby, Principle 12 obtained direct legal effects.
383
 Since 
the principle was used to find a violation of Article XX of the GATT, which is be-
yond question a binding rule, Principle 12 and the obligation to cooperate interna-
tionally became legally binding itself.
384
 
Hence, Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration can, although being soft law, lead to a 
legally binding obligation to seek for international cooperation regarding extraterrito-
rial environmental concerns. Thus, its content has to be analysed in order to assess 
the legality of unilateral measures to protect the environment. 
 
b) The content of Principle 12 
It needs to be examined whether Principle 12 stipulates a strict obligation to cooper-
ate internationally or whether unilateral measures are permitted under that principle.  
According to the text of the principle, international cooperation is the general 
rule since international environmental concerns ‘should, as far as possible’ be ad-
dressed by internationally agreed solutions.
385
 In contrast to that, unilateral measures 
are the exception in the trade-environment context for they should be avoided ac-
cording to Principle 12 sentence 3 of the Rio Declaration.
386
  
The parties to the Rio Declaration have acknowledged this rule-exception rela-
tionship since the declaration expresses international consensus.
387
 Moreover, Princi-
ple 12 is a highly important provision in the current trade-environment relationship 
for it includes both international custom and developing principles of international 
law with regard to international environmental protection.
388
  
Thus, the rule-exception relationship stipulated in Principle 12 of the Rio Decla-
ration should be taken seriously. Unilateral measures concerning extraterritorial envi-
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The principle of international cooperation contains the general rule that countries 
have to seek for international consensus before implementing a measure that relates 
to extraterritorially located environmental concerns unilaterally. International coop-
eration is the rules whereas unilateral measures pose the exception. An exception can 
only be invoked where either an agreement based on negotiations could not have 
been reached after reasonable efforts or negotiation and cooperation structures are 















The legality of unilateral measures with extraterritorial effect to protect the environ-
ment under the WTO/GATT is a highly complex issue. What must be analysed in 
order to assess the legality of such measures are not only the conflicting provisions 
and interests under the WTO/GATT itself but also general principles of international 
law. 
The WTO/GATT adjudicating body has had occasion to comment on the legality 
of unilateral measures with extraterritorial effect to protect the environment. Accord-
ing to the Tuna-Dolphin dispute, such measures were unlawful. The Shrimp-Turtle 
decision suggested that extraterritorial measures to protect the environment could be 
lawful provided they satisfied certain conditions. These conditions derive both from 
the GATT and general principles of international law. The AB chose an appropriate 
approach to solve the trade-environment conflict which allowed WTO Members to 
further international environmental protection standards and, at the same time, en-
sured the liberalisation of international trade.  
By drawing on the Shrimp-Turtle decision, the WTO adjudicating body can en-
hance a consistent jurisprudence and legal certainty among WTO Members as long 
as the Members themselves cannot find a solution to the issue of extraterritorial 
measures to protect the environment. 
 
1. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SHRIMP-TURTLE DECISION 
The Shrimp-Turtle decision clarified the requirements of Article XX (g) of the 
GATT pointing out several conditions that an extraterritorial measure to protect the 
environment had to meet. 
The first condition that the AB pointed out in Shrimp-Turtle was the sufficient-
nexus requirement. Interpreting paragraph g of Article XX of the GATT, the AB held 
that there had to be a sufficient nexus between the resource to be protected and the 
country implementing the protection measure. However, the meaning of ‘sufficient 
nexus’ still needs to be clarified by prospective panels and the AB. Prospective deci-
sions should particularly determine what the nature of the nexus is and when the 












Secondly, according to the AB, countries had to seriously attempt to reach a mul-
tilateral agreement with all countries concerned before implementing a measure ad-
dressing international environmental concerns. Particularly in terms of migratory 
species, the regulating country has to include every country through which the spe-
cies migrate. How hard a country has to seek for a multilateral solution depends on 
the relevant circumstances of each case. 
Besides that, the AB employed multilateral agreements other than the GATT to 
interpret Article XX (g) of the GATT. The analysis in this paper showed that this is a 
legitimate approach to interpret the GATT. 
Moreover, the Shrimp-Turtle decision introduced a balancing test under the cha-
peau of Article XX of the GATT. The AB balanced the right of a Member to invoke 
an exception under the individual paragraphs of Article XX and the substantive 
rights of other Members concerned under the GATT. In order to structure the balanc-
ing of rights, the European approach to the balancing process by means of the pro-
portionality principle should be transferred to the chapeau of Article XX of the 
GATT. Under EU law, a measure is consistent with the proportionality principle if it 
is suitable, necessary and proportionate in the narrow sense in relation to a legitimate 
policy goal. This approach is a useful tool to order the balancing process.  
What must be taken into account is that due to the principle of international co-
operation, a unilateral measure to promote extraterritorial environmental concerns 
can only be the exception to the rule, even where the measure is consistent with the 
balancing/proportionality principle. 
 
2. THE ROLE OF THE WTO ADJUDICATING BODY 
Prospective WTO decisions should draw on and clarify the conditions outlined by 
Shrimp-Turtle.  
Since the current round of trade negotiations within the WTO turned out to be 
time consuming and complex, a negotiated compromise by the WTO Members is not 
likely to be reached in the near future. It is particularly unlikely that the Member 
States will adopt a provision clarifying the trade-environment relation or explicitly 
implement the proportionality principle into WTO law.  
Thus, it is the task of the WTO adjudicating body to clarify and refine the condi-
tions under which Members can unilaterally implement measures with extraterritorial 
effect to protect the environment. If the WTO adjudicating body draws on the criteria 












ancing of conflicting rights under Article XX of the GATT, WTO jurisprudence will 
gain an increase of predictability and WTO Members will have more legal certainty 
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